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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment is often perceived as a feminist issue.1 Although it is true
that women are victimized disproportionately,2 it would be wrong to categorize
sexual harassment as one of the vulnerabilities of the "fairer, gentler sex" because
sexual harassment, like rape, is not about sex but about gender and power.' It is
not a woman's sexual attractiveness which makes her vulnerable to physical and
verbal sexual abuse; it is society's stereotypical view of her as a powerless and sub-
ordinate sex object.4 Before sexual harassment became generally accepted as de-
noting sex discrimination, courts refused to recognize that such conduct violated
sex discrimination laws because they failed to give credence to the above distinc-
tion. Women who refused to grant sexual favors and who thus suffered retaliation,
it was argued, were discriminated against not because of their gender but because
1. Most commentators on the subject have been women, and excluding legal periodicals, most articles have
appeared in magazines published for female subscribers. See, e.g., infra note 2. At the University of Mississippi
School of Law, only twenty-eight pages of the casebook presently being used to teach constitutional law address
sex-based discrimination. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 642-69 (11 th ed. 1985). Only one case is
discussed in detail, and of the ten cases mentioned, five were brought by male plaintiffs challenging the constitu-
tionality of statutes granting preferential treatment to women. Id.
2. An informal study conducted by a women's magazine concluded that 88% of the 9,000 women surveyed
reported having been sexually harassed on the job. Claire Safran, What Men do to Women on the Job, REDBOOK,
Nov. 1976, at 149. Of course, women who had suffered such abuse would be more likely to respond, and there-
fore the self-selective nature of the survey undermines the integrity of its results. Nonetheless, the fact that 8,100
American women experienced sexual harassment at work is significant, especially since before 1976, it was lit-
erally an unspeakable term. The phrase became a term of art through the efforts of the Working Women's Insti-
tute, a resource center for sexually abused women in New York City, New York. See CATHARINE MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION xiv (1979) [hereinafter MACKIN-
NON].
In a more recent and more rigorous study, the Merit System Protection Board, an independent agency that over-
sees the hiring and firing of federal employees, conducted a survey at the behest of Congress in 1980 to determine
the extent of sexual harassment in the federal work place. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 6 (1981). Of the 23,000 federal employees, 42 % of
all female employees reported being harassed. Surprisingly, 15 % of male employees were also included among
the ranks of the sexually harassed. Id. at 35; see also 1988 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5139, at 6365 (reprint of
text of Executive Summary of a follow-up survey conducted in 1987).
This paper will address almost exclusively the sexual harassment of women, and therefore, female pronouns
will be used more extensively than male. However, the authors recognize that men also can be and have been
victimized as shown by the above survey results. The rarity of these occurrences is due to the fact that few women
are in a position of power to harass men sexually, and the infrequency is comparable to the freakish occurrence of
male rape. See MACKINNON, supra at 31, 202.
3. See LOREENE M. G. CLARK & DEBRA J. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 167 (1977).
4. Indeed, it is a woman's defenselessness and vulnerability which can make her sexually irresistible. See
MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 218-19.
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of their sexuality. I This same misguided view of sexual harassment, although long
since refuted by the judiciary, is still held by many. The most public display oc-
curred during the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas in which Anita Hill had accused Justice Thomas of sexual harassment
while he was her supervisor at the United States Department of Education and at
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Some of the Senators ques-
tioned Hill about her sexual attraction to Justice Thomas and her private sexual
fantasies, as if implying that his sexual advances, assuming they occurred, were
somehow motivated only by her sexuality.6 In doing so, these Senators appeared
to be adopting the view that the occurrence of sexually harassing conduct, no mat-
ter how unwelcome, should be excused whenever there is the possibility of a sex-
ual attraction between the harasser and his victim.7 Implicit in this view is the
misconception that sexual harassment occurs because of the sexual attractiveness
of the harasser's victim. To the contrary, sexual harassment occurs because of an
abuse of power and is defined in general as the "unwanted imposition of sexual re-
quirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."8 In the workplace,
this power is usually wielded by the harasser through economic coercion.' This
5. See Williams v. Saxbee, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (1976). One commentator argued, "[ilf someone were to
kill another person with a rolling pin, we would not consider it cooking." Verta A. Taylor, How to Avoid Taking
Sexual Harassment Seriously: A New Book That Perpetuates Old Myths, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 673, 675 (1981).
6. See Symposium, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1992).
7. "Nowhere is a woman treated according to the merit of her work, but rather as a sex. It is therefore almost
inevitable that she should pay for her right to exist, to keep a position in whatever line, with sex favors." EMMA
GOLDMAN, THE TRAFFIC IN WOMEN 20 (1970).
8. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 1. Studies by the Working Women's Institute indicate that 75% of harassers
have direct authority over their victims. See Donna Lenhoff, Sexual Harassment: No More Business As Usual,
TRIAL, July 1981, at 42. Based on the data from the Merit Systems study, see supra note 2, researchers concluded
that sexual harassment is based on the personal power of gender where males are dominant. See Sandra S. Tangri
et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs 33, 50 (1982). Notably, this con-
clusion contradicted the commonly held perception that workplace sexual harassment is an extension of human
sexuality. Id. For that perception to hold true, female victims of harassment would have to be similar to the haras-
ser in age and race, a finding which was not supported by the data. Id. at 44.
9. "[W]omen consistently occupy the lowest-status, lowest-paying jobs, much lower than men of the same
education and experience." MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 38; see also infra note 22 (noting similarity in use of
economic deprivation by employer and by battering husband).
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same power struggle is also apparent in racial harassment cases: both scenarios in-
volve one group's attempt to dominate another.10
Although sexual harassment is a newly-exposed problem, it is itself an old phe-
nomena. The first written reports date back to the nineteenth century when
women began entering the labor markets in greater numbers and in more varied
positions.11 Nonetheless, women who worked outside the home were still the ex-
ception at the close of the century. In general, they were forced into employment
by poverty, 2 and, thus, were drawn from the least powerful classes. Moreover,
they were invariably the product of a dysfunctional family, dysfunctional because
of the singular absence of a male provider, who was either dead or disabled. 3 So-
10. Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 30-32
(1981). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on sexual harassment include a
footnote stating: "The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin." 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (1980). Furthermore, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was being considered
for amendment in 1972, a Senate Committee reported that "recent studies have shown that there is a close corre-
lation between discrimination based on sex and racial discrimination, and that both possess similar characteris-
tics." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). For further discussion of the debate surrounding the
proposed amendments, see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
A perfect analogy between race and sex discrimination does not exist. Although courts have often averted to
racial harassment cases for legal precedent, many have found the causes of action clearly distinguishable. One of
the main differences stems from the historic and social perceptions of race and sex classifications. Race classifi-
cations are inherently suspect under the equal protection clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United
States Constitution, the latter having been enacted for the specific purpose of eradicating racial discrimination.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (first racial discrimination case under 14th Amendment;
invalidated state law excluding blacks from jury duty under heightened scrutiny ofjudicial review).
On the other hand, classifications based on sex are only quasi-suspect for the purpose of an equal protection
analysis and must meet only an intermediate level ofjudicial review. See Bakke v. Board of Regents, 438 U.S.
265, 303 (1978) (refusing to view gender discrimination as comparable to racial classification).
11. Untrained and unskilled in most gainful occupations, women maintained a precarious economic position
in which the threat of dismissal was usually all that was necessary for the employer to solicit sexual favors. Jill
Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go,
10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445,448-50 (1981). Most of the historic records documenting the existence of sexual abuse
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries come from interviews and early court records. See Eleanor K. Bratton,
The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17
N.M. L. REv. 91,95 (1987).
12. RoBERr W. SMUTS, WOMEN AND WORK IN AMERICA 17-23 (1959).
13. Id. at 38, 87-88, 112. In this century, the growing trend of poor women, often described as the "feminiza-
tion of poverty," was likewise created by a substantial increase in the number of female-headed households. See
Diana Pearce, Welfare Is Not for Women: Toward a Model of Advocacy To Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 412, 412 (1985). Of the net increase of 129,000 poor families in 1983, the Bureau of Cen-
sus reports that 95 % were headed by women. Id. at 413. Sociologists attribute the cause to two culprits: unequal
treatment in the labor market and divorce, both of which explains the adage, "every woman is a man away from
welfare." See id. at 412. Statistically, the labor force participation of these women is substantially higher than
their female counterparts. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 15. Thus, even today, women's employment is not gen-
erally by choice but by economic necessity.
[Vol. 13:37
SEXUAL HARASSMENTLA WDEVELOPMENTS
ciety regarded these women with the same degree of respect as prostitutes and
branded them, not with a scarlet letter,14 but with a badge of slavery."5
The earliest popular accounts of sexual harassment in the workplace appeared
in 1908 when Harper's Bazaar solicited and published stories from women readers
who in the past ten years had migrated to the cities. 16 Unfortunately, much of what
was described then is still true today. The following incident recounted by Ruth, a
sixteen-year old Russian immigrant, whose first words learned and spoken in En-
glish were "keep your hands off please," illustrates how a working woman in the
early 1900s was viewed and treated by her male supervisor.
[My boss] greeted me in the middle of the room, touched my hair with his fingers,
and then went and sat down .... After a moment or so he said quite abruptly,
"Come, Ruth, sit down here." He motioned to his knee. I felt my face flush. I backed
away towards the door and stood staring at him. He too sat quite still looking at me.
Then he rose with his usual slowness and quietness[,] put his hand into his pocket,
took out a roll of bills, counted off three dollars, and brought it over to me at the
door. "Tell your father," he said, "to find you a new shop for to-morrow morning."17
Incidents of sexual harassment were not limited then, and are still not limited to-
day, to those occupations dominated by female labor. Such incidents occurred, and
continue to occur, with the same frequency in traditionally male fields."
Although the history of sexual harassment in employment is well-documented,
only recently has it been recognized that both the individual employee and the
workplace as a whole suffer equally from such abuse. With regard to the em-
ployee, studies show that the victim incurs significant economic as well as psycho-
14. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
15. Although this term is most often associated with the 13th Amendment's prohibition against slavery, it is
also appropriately used whenever one group chooses to oppress another with a badge of inferiority. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding power of Congress to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion in the sale and rental of real property under authority of 13th Amendment which was intended to eradicate all
badges and incidents of slavery).
"[Sexual requirements of work are] a reminder, a badge or indicia [sic] of the servile status she suffered...
and which she is now trying to shake off .... To make her advancement on the job depend on her sexual per-
formance is to resurrect her former status as man's property or plaything." Memorandum in Opposition to De-
fendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII Claim at 14-15, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), reprinted in MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 177.
16. See The Girl Who Comes to the City: A Symposium, 42 HARPER's BAZAR 692, 693 (1908) (saleswomen
experienced repeated propositions); 42 HARPER's BAZAR 394, 398 (1908) (nurse was told to provide sexual fa-
vors if she wanted more work); 42 HARPER's BAZAR 277, 278 (1908) (doctor's stenographer was sexually har-
assed).
17. RosE COHEN, OUT OF THE SHADOW 129(1918).
18. Mary Bularzik, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes, RADICAL AMERICA, July 1978, at
25, 38-39 (first women to enter medical profession as doctors suffered severe harassment). In Broderick v.
Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (D.D.C. 1988), a female attorney prevailed in her sex discrimination action
against her employer, the Securities Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC"). She related that during her
eight-year sojourn a potpourri of sexual favors were solicited and engaged in by female secretaries seeking prefer-
ential treatment. Id.; see 'Harassed'SEC Lawyer to Get Back Pay, Promotion, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 17,
1988, at 1. The SEC is the enforcement agency for the United States securities law. If sexual harassment can
occur among such professionals and at such a pervasive level, then no occupation is immune.
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logical19 burdens (1) such as a decline in work performance caused by a loss of
concentration, fear, humiliation and low self-esteem with resulting adverse eco-
nomic consequences; 20 and (2) psychological symptoms, such as terminal insom-
nia, depression and nervousness.21 These symptoms described what some
commentators now refer to as "sexual harassment syndrome."22 What follows be-
low is a psychiatrist's description of a female victim of sexual harassment and is
typical of the adjustment disorders experienced by most sexually harassed female
employees: "[s] he began to hate her job and she felt alienated from the other pur-
chasing agents (all men). She became irritable, bitter, and developed insomnia and
her concentration, appetite, and sexual interest declined. She became prone to un-
predictable crying spells in the office and, on one occasion, she fainted."2 In a
study of harassed female employees, the same psychiatrist reported that most of
these women felt a compelling desire for revenge and vindication against their em-
ployer and that their continued employment, even after successful litigation, usu-
ally perpetuated their psychiatric problems. 24
With regard to the employer, these reactions result in diminished productivity,
increased absenteeism, and higher employee turnover. Indeed, according to a
1988 survey of 160 "Fortune 500" companies, an average business lost $6.7 mil-
lion every year because of sexual harassment.25 These costs, of course, are in ad-
dition to the legal costs in defending and settling lawsuits, which in many cases rise
to the level of millions of dollars.26
19. See Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in the Women's Workplace, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
399, 403 (1985).
20. Some courts have held, and logically so, that deficiency in work performance, when it is the direct result
of sexual harassment, cannot be relied upon by the employer as a legitimate reason for her termination or for any
other adverse employment decision. See Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 n. 10 (D. D.C. 1988) (em-
ployee's alleged deficiencies were attributed to abusive work environment and could not be used to justify em-
ployer's reprimands).
21. Bursten, supra note 19, at 403.
22. Bursten, supra note 19, at 404. This term is borrowed from a similar disorder known as "battered wife
syndrome." Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon finds an analogy between beating one's wife and harassing one's fe-
male employees: both are systematically tolerated. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 160. It should also be noted that
both the husband and employer use similar threats of economic deprivation as a form of control. See LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 129 (1979).
23. Bursten, supra note 19, at 404. Much of the emotional effect parallels that felt by women who are raped.
MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 47.
24. Bursten, supra note 19, at 404-05.
25. James G. Frierson, Only One Way to Deal with It: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Costly in Produc-
tion, Absenteeism, Turnover, PREVENTIVE L. REP., June 1989, at 3, 3.
26. Id. The employer may also be statutorily liable for attorney's fees which often can exceed the amount of
actual damages to the employee. See EEOC v. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court awarded
victim of sexual harassment $33,000 in backpay and over $90,000 in attorney's fees); see also Jay W. Waks &
Michael G. Starr, The "Sexual Shakedown"in Perspective: Sexual Harassment in Its Social and Legal Contexts, 7
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567, 570 (1982).
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Sexual harassment does not occur solely in the workplace. It is no less an infes-
tation in prisons,27 in housing,28 and in the armed forces.29 Nevertheless, this ar-
ticle will continue to focus primarily on harassment in employment, if only
because it represents the main area in which Congress has taken legislative action.
The paper will begin with a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 including the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission31 and any statutory orjudicially-created employer defenses. This
discussion will include an analysis of the amendments to Title VII enacted pursu-
ant to the Civil Rights Act of 199132 and of the "Reasonable Woman" standard now
being applied in a limited number of federal circuit courts.33 Although the paper
analyzes decisions primarily from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the fed-
eral district courts of Mississippi, decisions from other jurisdictions which dem-
onstrate a growing trend in the law or which are otherwise notable will also be
discussed.
II. WHAT BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTES SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
"The problem [with sexual harassment law] comes in trying to establish legal
remedies for. . . boorish behavior. My point. . . is simply that not every offen-
sive act is capable of legal redress, that sometimes the intrusion of the law can cre-
ate more problems than it solves."34
The difficulty with determining what behavior should constitute sexual harass-
ment in the workplace is that there is a wide divergence of opinion as to the bound-
aries of socially acceptable conduct between the sexes. It is firmly settled that not
all "boorish" behavior will result in legal liability35 but the existing legal standards
27. The imbalance of power between a male guard and his female prisoner is more severe than male domi-
nance over women in the workplace, and thus sexual coercion in prison is an even greater temptation for the man
and an even harder incident for the woman to report. See Laurie A. Hanson, Comment, Women Prisoners: Free-
domfrom Sexual Harassment- A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 667,667 n.3 (1983). The
real basis for causes of action filed by female prisoners alleging sexual harassment has been the constitutional
right of privacy under the penumbra of the 4th Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240,
1246-47 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. Most of the victims of sexual harassment in housing are tenants who are sexually exploited by property
owners, property managers or real estate agents. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of
Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. Rav. 1061, 1061 & n.2. In the landmark case, Shellhammer v. Le-
wallen, I Fair Housing - Fair Lending Rptr. 15,472, at 135 (W.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 770 F2d 167 (6th Cir.
1985), a federal district court held for the first time that sexual harassment in housing violates the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
29. According to a survey conducted by the United States Army, 50% of the women soldiers in Germany com-
plained of male sexual harassment. Army Survey Finds Sexual Harassment of Military Women Overseas, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Mar. 26, 1980, at A7.
30. See supra and infra notes 8-310 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 73, 188 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 252-307 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 124-65 and accompanying text.
34. William Raspberry, The Right Remedy for Harassment, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 27, 1981, at 19.
35. Compare Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (co-workers' crude lan-
guage and dirty jokes were not sufficient to prove sexual harassment claim) with Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F
Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987) (statements to female employee such as "O.K., babe[,]" and "Listen here[,] woman,"
as well as other similar behavior were sufficient to constitute sexual harassment).
19921
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
imposed by federal legislation, as discussed below, fail to offer any precise defini-
tion.36 Moreover, except for the most aggravated instances, there is no general
consensus among the courts .31 Indeed, the definition is constantly being reformu-
lated on a case by case basis, and, unfortunately, is likely to remain contingent on
the particular facts of each case.38
The absence of a social or legal definition of sexual harassment makes attempts
to eradicate such behavior all the more difficult: How can one advise and encour-
age employers to prevent conduct which remains undefinable? Even the male
harasser is often himself genuinely surprised when others identify his actions as
purposeful harassment.39
As a possible solution, one commentator suggests that courts regularly examine
the following four factors when determining the rubrics of sexually harassing be-
havior:
(1) [T]he extent to which the conduct affected the employee terms and conditions of
employment;
(2) [W]hether the conduct was repeated or isolated;
(3) [W]hether the conduct was intended or perceived seriously or in jest; and
(4) [T]he degree to which the conduct is contrary to community standards.40
36. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), upon which most other legisla-
tion in this area is based, makes no specific reference to sexual harassment, and its designated enforcement
agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Agency (EEOC), has promulgated guidelines which are so broadly
based that they too offer little guidance. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1982); infra text accompanying note 76.
37. The most egregious form of sexual harassment is, of course, rape. See Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d
1226, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1987) (female employee drugged, raped and fired by company owner awarded
$113,000 in damages); see also Seth Kaberon, $113,000 Award Affirmed for Woman Fired After Rape, Cm.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 4, 1987, at 1. Sexual harassment is also easily recognized in its more traditional form, that
is, when submission to request for sexual favors is made a prerequisite for certain tangible benefits.
38. Cases are fact sensitive because the standard used in determining whether conduct is offensive is some-
times based on the subjective perceptions of the victim. See Patricia Linenberger, What Behavior Constitutes Sex-
ual Harassment?, 34 LAB. L.J. 238, 244 & n.39 (1983).
39. For example, following charges of sexual harassment by eleven female employees, Dean Geoffrey W. Pe-
ters of the William Mitchell College of Law resigned in November, 1983. The comptroller of the school, Michael
Carlson, was also charged with sexual harassment and placed on probation. In a subsequent letter of apology to
the board of trustees, Carlson wrote the following: "I do not dispute that during the course of my employment at
William Mitchell I have done some things and said some things which I should not have done and said." Mr.
Carlson went on to say that he had not intended to harass anyone sexually but that "several people have indicated
that they were offended by my behavior." Austin C. Wehrwein, Law School Dean Quits in Scandal, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 21, 1983, at 3. The forms of harassment that the employees complained of included over forty "incidents of
sexually-motivated touching and fondling, derogatory and suggestive comments, and propositioning ... involv-
ing Dean Peters or Mr. Carlson." Id. at 36. Because of the severity of these allegations, it is difficult to surmise
how the dean could have explained his conduct as being misinterpreted flirtations. What is even more surprising
is the response of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, which declined to discipline Dean
Peters and which concluded: "Assuming the complainants' allegations to be true, there is serious doubt whether
such conduct. . . is disciplinable. . . ." David A. Kaplan, Ethics Rules Held Not to Cover Complaints of Sexual
Harassment, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1984, at 4. Compare this ruling with the decision by the Illinois Courts Com-
mission to reprimand Cook County Circuit Judge Arthur J. Cieslik for the following remarks: "Ladies should not
be lawyers"; "If your husband had kept his hands in his pocket, you [a pregnant female attorney] would not be in
the condition you are in"; "I [will] never allow a pregnant woman to try a case before [me] again"; "Ladies should
be at home raising a family." Katherine Schweit,Judge Reprimanded for Sexist Comments, CHi. DAILY L. BULL.,
July 31, 1987, at 1, 16.
40. Ralph H. Baxter, Jr., Judicial andAdministrative Protecting Against Sexual Harassment in the Work Place, 7
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 587, 589 (1981-82).
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Another commentator suggests that a workable definition of sexual harassment re-
quires a list of examples of such behavior, such as the following:
[S]taring, ogling, any kind of unsolicited touching (including "accidental" brush-
ing), verbal and nonverbal criticizing and commenting upon an individual's body,
unsolicited grabbing, kissing, squeezing, smacking, pinching, and pulling part of an
individual's body (including hair), unsolicited propositions, suggestions and de-
mands for dates and/or involvement in sexual activity, posting or placing near an in-
dividual's work environment an obscene picture (excluding recognized artwork),
derogatory jokes and pictures, and forced sexual activity (including rape) .41
Unfortunately, despite the above definitions, the simple truth is that, with the ex-
ception of the most blatant instances of sexual harassment, both employers and
employees alike cannot be sure about what conduct in the workplace is permissi-
ble.
42
One matter, however, is now certain: sexual harassment constitutes a form of
sex-based discrimination which will expose the employer to liability under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VII").1 Understanding how
sexual harassment violates Title VII is instructive, not only in understanding the
current status of the law, but also in determining, to the extent possible, what con-
duct may or will constitute such behavior.
III. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
As originally proposed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "the Act")
provided equal employment opportunities, under Title VII, to individuals who
would otherwise be discriminated against because of their race, religion, or na-
tional origin." Congress did not intend to eradicate all unfair treatment in the
workplace but to excuse only those discriminatory practices directed against mem-
bers of a protected class.45 The legislation was considered and debated with no
mention of gender-based discrimination until the eleventh hour when Senator Rus-
41. Suzanne E. Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J.
113, 119(1983).
42. See Gary R. Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability: The Flirtation that Could Cost a For-
tune, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 277, 286 (1980).
43.42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e- 17 (1982).
44.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
45. [Title VII] does not command that any person
be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a
minority group .... What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of [an]
impermissible classification.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-431 (1971).
Although Title VII covers narrowly defined classifications, discrimination itself is defi'ed broadly. See Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that Congress intended to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
It should also be noted that Title VII does not cover all employers but only those "engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who [have] fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Congress
did not intend to eradicate all discrimination in employment.
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sell added "sex" by a floor amendment as an attempt to defeat the bill.46 Because of
the peculiar manner of its inclusion, there is little legislative history as to this par-
ticular amendment.47 It was made clear, however, in the legislative history of the
1972 amendments to the Act' that Congress considered discrimination against
women to be "no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment prac-
tices.""
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII contains the substantive provision of the Act
which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ... "
In order to understand an employer's exposure to liability under the Act, it is
important to understand the manner in which claimants prove their discrimination
claims under Title VII. 1 Under the dictates of the Act, overt discrimination
against applicants and employees is easily attacked and remedied.52 For example, a
job advertisement stating "No Blacks Need Apply," would violate the Act and
would constitute direct evidence of intentional discrimination. 3 Eventually, how-
ever, the effectiveness of the Act was jeopardized as job applicants and employees
began encountering problems of proof.' Employers had become more savvy and
had begun engaging in subtler forms of discrimination in order to make litigation
under the Act more difficult. 5 For example, employers replaced office signs stat-
ing "No Blacks Need Apply" with signs stating "All Employee Applicants Must
46. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-82 (1964). On February 8, 1964, Rep. Smith added the amendment which was
adopted by the House of Representatives without a hearing. Id. at 2582, 2584.
47. Id. at 2582, 2584. There was some debate in the House of Representatives and no reference to sexual har-
assment. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(a) (1982). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended coverage of
Title VII to federal, state and local employees and stated, as follows: "All personnel actions affecting employees
... in executive agencies [of the United States] ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on...
sex." Id.
49. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141.
"Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated be-
cause of their sex. Numerous studies have shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsi-
ble and the less renumerative positions on the basis of their sex alone." Id. at 2140. The 1972 amendments do not
mention sexual harassment. Id.
50.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
51. In order to prevail under Title VII, an aggrieved employee must prove (I) that the employer is covered by
Title VII; (2) that the employer's acts were premised on an impermissible basis, such as race, color, religion, sex
or national origin; (3) that the act was on an issue cognizable under Title VII; and (4) that there was a causal
connection between the basis and the issue. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1983). Without direct evidence of an employer's intent, such as an oral admis-
sion or written memorandum, it is difficult to prove the required nexus between an adverse employment decision
and the classification.






Have High School Diplomas."56 By implementing such requirements, employers
achieved the same result, assuming that the number of blacks with high school di-
plomas in the workforce was considerably lower than whites." The discrimina-
tory effect of such a policy is not as obvious or easy to prove in the second case
scenario. Two new theories, the disparate impact theory and the disparate treat-
ment theory, were eventually adopted by the courts to assist claimants in establish-
ing a prima facie case of discrimination when the only form of proof available to
the applicant or employee was circumstantial evidence.
The first theory, disparate impact, is most often utilized in cases where an em-
ployer's policy or practice, although neutral on its face, has an adverse impact on a
protected class which the employer cannot justify by business necessity. 58 For ex-
ample, an employer who adopts a high school diploma requirement for his work
force violates Title VII if the requirement disproportionately excludes blacks un-
less the employer can justify its existence as a business necessity. It should be
noted that it is not necessary that the employee or applicant prove that the employ-
ment practice was implemented for a discriminatory purpose but only that it has a
discriminatory effect.59
The second theory, disparate treatment, is met whenever an employer's treat-
ment of an employee differs from that accorded to similarly situated individuals
56. This example is loosely based on the fact situation presented in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
425-26 (1971). In Griggs, the employer's high school diploma requirement was implemented on July 2, 1964, the
date on which Title VII became effective. Id. at 427. Prior to that date, the company had followed a policy of
overt racial discrimination. Id. at 426-27. Needless to say, the requirement excluded a greater portion of black
job applicants. Id. at 426.
57. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425. More specifically, there is a tripartite order of proof in the disparate impact
case. First, the plaintiff must show that an employment policy or practice has a substantially disproportionate
exclusionary impact on a protected class. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977). In Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the employee must identify the
"specific" policy or practice responsible for the disproportionate impact. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) slightly changed that holding. Under the Act, an employee need not
identify the specific employment practice when the elements of an employer's decision-making process are not
capable of separation for analysis. Id. The defendant employer can attack plaintiffs case at this stage of proof by
demonstrating a deficiency in the statistical evidence or by showing that the disparity is not statistically signifi-
cant. See, e.g., Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 1981) (disparity in percentages insufficient to
establish prima facie case); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659,664-65 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 919 (1981).
Second, if plaintiff establishes impact, then the defendant employer must show that the practice serves a busi-
ness necessity. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Under the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(l)(A), the burden of persuasion is shifted to the employer to demonstrate business necessity.
Third, the plaintiff can show that other employment practices serve the employer's legitimate interests with
lesser adverse impact. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975). Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A), (C), it is not necessary that the plaintiff prove that the alternative em-
ployment practices were equally effective in achieving the employer's interests. For a discussion of the impact of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on sexual harassment law, see infra notes 254-310 and accompanying text.
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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outside the employee's protected class.6 Thus, in the example set out above, a
black applicant without a high school diploma could prove discrimination under
the disparate treatment theory by showing that the employer refused to hire him
for this reason but hired white non-graduates. Such evidence indicates that the em-
ployment practice was used as a pretext for intentional discrimination.
A. Sexual Harassment as a Form
of Sex-Based Discrimination
Title VII does not directly prohibit sexual harassment, but sexual harassment
nevertheless violates the Act because it is a form of sex-based discrimination. For
at least a decade before the United States Supreme Court's first pronouncement on
the issue in 1986,1 the federal appellate courts had unanimously concluded that
sexual harassment violates Title VII for this reason. 2 The Supreme Court was in
agreement in its later decision.3 However, there was an initial reluctance in the
early trial court cases to find a connection between sexual harassment and sex dis-
crimination.64 These judges considered sexual harassment to be a personal injury
that was not exclusive to one gender and that could be visited upon either gender,
60. The disparate treatment theory was set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973), and requires that plaintiff prove four elements in establishing a prima facie case: (I) that she is a member
of a protected group; (2) that she is qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that she
was denied the position; and (4) that after her rejection, the position remained open. Id. The burden of produc-
tion then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. Id. The
plaintiff employee is then afforded an opportunity to attack the employer's reason as a pretext for illicit discrimi-
nation. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978).
61. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For a full discussion of the Supreme Court's Vinson
decision, see infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
62. Women had to wait until the mid- 1970s, 10 years after Title VII was in effect, for the first successful sex-
ual harassment claim. William L. Kandel, Current Developments in Employment Litigation: Sexual Harassment:
Persistent, Prevalent, but Preventable, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 439,439 (1988). The delay "[was] more of a prob-
lem of social attitude than a legal problem of proof." Russell W. Whittenberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: A
Jurisprudential Analysis, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 607, 608 & n. 10.
63. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63-64.
64. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), revd, 568
F2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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or even the same gender.6" Thus, since the word "sex" in Title VII was interpreted,
and continues to be interpreted, to mean "gender," rather than its more titillating
connotation, sexual harassment at first was deemed to fall outside the prohibition
of the Act. 66
It was the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in Barnes v. Costle6 7 that,
on reversal of the district court's decision, produced the most explicit treatment of
the issue. In holding that sexual harassment is sex discrimination, the Barnes court
established a trend that other courts have since followed.68 In Barnes, the em-
ployer had argued that the female plaintiff had been discriminated against, not be-
cause of her sex, but because of her failure to comply with her supervisor's sexual
demands.69 In rejecting this argument, the Barnes court explained:
But for her womanhood .. her participation in sexual activity would never have
been solicited. To say, then, that she was victimized in her employment simply be-
cause she declined the invitation is to ignore the asserted fact that she was invited
only because she was a woman, subordinate to the inviter in the hierarchy of agency
personnel. Put another way, she became the target of her superior's sexual desires
because she was a woman and was asked to bow to his demands as the price for hold-
ing her job. The circumstance imparting high visibility to the role of gender in the
65. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 57-58. In the first reported adjudication of a sexual harassment claim,
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 562 F2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977), the trial judge denied relief to two clerical workers who had allegedly been subjected to repeated
physical sexual advances and propositions because in his view "an outgrowth of holding such activity to be ac-
tionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexu-
ally[-]oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to
have employees who were asexual." Id. at 163-64.
Using similar reasoning, the trial court judge in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F Supp. 553,
556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977), found that sexual harassment, as a matter of law, was
not gender-based discrimination:
In this instance the supervisor was male, the employee was female. But no immutable principle of psy-
chology compels this alignment of parties. The gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even
not crossed at all. While sexual desire animated the parties, or at least one of them, the gender of each is
incidental to the claim of abuse.
Id. An opposite result, the judge feared, would lead to liability for social dialogues of any kind in the workplace,
such as invitations to dinner or excesses at office Christmas parties. Id. at 557; see MAcKINNON, supru note 2, at
69-72, 147. The natural legal conclusion to draw from these two cases would be that only a bisexual supervisor
can not discriminate because only a bisexual has an equal sexual preference. MACINNON, supra note 2, at 203.
66. Title VII does not protect employees from discrimination because of their sexual preference, sexuality, or
sexual behavior. Just because a discriminatory practice involves something sexual does not mean that it is prohib-
ited under Title VII. Thus, for example, an employer may fire a homosexual employee because of the employee's
sexual preference. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (Congress never in-
tended for Title VII to protect individual's sexual orientation). But see Lynn McLain, The EEOC Sexual Harass-
ment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII?, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 275, 290 (1981) (claiming that when
EEOC enacted regulations prohibiting sexual harassment, it substituted the word "sexual" for "sex"). As of yet,
no sexual preference discrimination case has been tried under the theory that an employer's policy disproportion-
ately excludes males because more males than females are homosexual. See McLain, supra, at 285 n.56.
67. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 65-68; Goodman, supra note 11, at 460. Although Judge Richey in Wil-
liams v. Saxbe, 413 F Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1976), has been credited with making the first connection
between sexual harassment and sex discrimination, he did not explore the matter fully but merely held that a pol-
icy of harassment applied to one gender was sufficient to create a cause of action under Title VII even though such
behavior could have been applied to both sexes. Id.
69. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990.
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affair is that no male employee was susceptible to such an approach by appellant's
supervisor. Thus, gender cannot be eliminated from the formulation which appellant
advocates, and that formulation advances a prima facie case of sex discrimination
within the purview of Title VII. 70
The Barnes court further determined in dicta that the same result would be
reached if a similar condition was imposed by a homosexual supervisor against a
member of the same sex,71 but not if by a bisexual against a member of either sex.72
A bisexual supervisor, by abusing both men and women, discriminates against
neither sex.
Subsequent to the recognition that sexual harassment was sex discrimination,
three types of cases emerged as cognizable causes of action under Title VII: (1)
quid pro quo harassment, (2) hostile environment harassment and (3) sexual fa-
voritism. " All three categories are included in the definition of sexual harassment
provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter
"EEOC"). " The EEOC is the independent regulatory agency charged with enforc-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and as part of that obligation, issued guidelines in
1980 which defined the following harassing acts as sex discrimination:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably75 interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.76
Although the EEOC Guidelines are merely an administrative interpretation of Ti-
tle VII and do not have the force of law, federal courts have relied heavily upon
them. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in its only decision on the issue of
sexual harassment cited the above Guidelines with approval, stating that they
"drew upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent"77 and
70. Id. (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 990 n.55; see, e.g., Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F Supp. 307 (N.D. I11. 1981).
72. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55; see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n. 11 (1 th Cir. 1982)
("Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is
discrimination based upon sex.").
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1982).
74. Id.
75. The word "unreasonably" replaced the word "substantially." The substitution was cryptically explained as
"more accurately stat[ing] the intent of the Commission .... 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
76. 29 C.FR. § 1604.11 (a) (1982).
77. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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constituted "a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and liti-
gants may properly resort for guidance."78
The first two definitions in the Guidelines refer to quid pro quo harassment, and
the last refers to hostile work environment harassment.7" The Guidelines are more
fully discussed in the following sections.
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Literally, "quid pro quo" is a latin phrase meaning "something for something,""
and of the three types of sexual harassment claims, the quid pro quo claim is the
easiest to identify: an employee is denied a tangible job benefit, such as a promo-
tion or salary increase, because she refuses to grant her employer's requests for
sexual favors.81 Catharine MacKinnon is credited with being the first to identify
such sexual harassment claims.8" MacKinnon envisions four possible scenarios af-
ter an employee requests sexual favors: (1) the employee refuses and thereby for-
feits an employment opportunity; (2) the employee refuses and receives
completely fair treatment;83 (3) the employee complies and does not receive a job
benefit; and (4) the employee complies and does receive a job benefit.84 Only the
first and third case scenarios are examples of quid pro quo harassment.
Courts normally treat quid pro quo cases under a disparate treatment analysis.
85
The proper allocation of proof under this analysis becomes, as follows:
1. The employee establishes a prima facie case by showing that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment and that she was denied some tangible aspect of the
terms of her employment for which she had a reasonable expectation. 88
2. The burden of production shifts to the employer to prove that its decision was
based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds.8 7
78. Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). The Supreme Court has not always felt compelled to give EEOC Guidelines
such favorable review and has rejected those which it has found to be ill-reasoned and inconsistent with prior case
law. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973) (rejecting EEOC Guidelines holding that
discrimination because of citizenship was always discrimination based on national origin). One of the reasons
these particular Guidelines were so well-received by the Supreme Court is because they follow the initial court
rulings on sexual harassment. Id. at 94.
79.29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (1982).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979).
81. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,619 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that quid pro quo claims have
given rise to greatest proliferation of sexual harassment cases), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
82. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 32-33.
83. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1989) (dispatcher sub-
jected to sexual harassment but suffered no adverse job consequences), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
84. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 32-33.
85. For a thorough discussion of the disparate treatment analysis as first set out under Title VII in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1971), see supra note 60. It should be noted that this analysis has re-
quired minor alterations to fit sexual harassment claims. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. 805 F.2d 611,619-20
(6th Cir. 1986) (setting out elements of sexual harassment claim), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
86. See Stephen Allred, Sexual Harassment: New Grounds for Employer Liability, 1987-1988 CURRENT MUN.
PROBLEMS 503, 505-06.
87. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
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3. The employee then may attempt to prove that the employer's stated reasons were
pretextual. 88
Usually, in order to establish a violation of Title VII, a claimant must first
present evidence that he or she is a member of a protected group.89 This step is
unnecessary in sexual harassment claims because Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion against either sex.9 Frequently, however, an employee will fail to establish a
prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment because of an inability to prove causa-
tion, that is, an inability to prove that her rejection of her employer's sexual ad-
vances was indeed the reason she suffered an adverse employment decision.91
Problems may also arise, although not as frequently, in proving that the harass-
ment was sex-based. 92 This is normally done by showing that the offending super-
visor harassed only females or only males." Thus, for example, a heterosexual
male supervisor who sexually harasses only his female subordinates and a homo-
sexual male supervisor who sexually harasses only his male subordinates both
commit gender-based discrimination. However, problems in proving that harass-
ment is sex-based arise when the victim is shown to have engaged in a prior con-
sensual intimate relationship with her harasser.
Specifically, a victim who suffers an adverse employment decision because of
her refusal to continue an ongoing sexual relationship with her employer must
show that the decision was made because of her gender and not because she was
his former lover.
To address this situation, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School District94 developed a subca-
tegory to the standard quid pro quo claim that the court referred to as "sexual retal-
iation."" The court began by distinguishing those cases in which an employer
expressly or impliedly demanded sexual favors in return for job benefits (the
standard quid pro quo claim) from those in which the employer made sexual ad-
vances without either expressing or implying that the job benefit would be denied
but later did deny the benefit (the sexual retaliation quid pro quo claim).96 Both
scenarios constituted- sex discrimination, but the distinction became important
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
90.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
91. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
plaintiffs discharge was result of excessive absenteeism and not because of sexual harassment), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1036 (1990).
92. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
93. See Allred, supra note 80, at 506. On the other hand, a bisexual male supervisor does not engage in sex
discrimination because he harasses both male and female subordinates alike. Id.
94. 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Il. 1989).




when there was a prior consensual relationship.97 In such cases, the court con-
cluded, the employee must overcome the presumption that the employment deci-
sion was the result of sexual retaliation because of a failed relationship.98 In order
to prevail, the employee must show at a minimum that the supervisor threatened
reprisal if she refused to continue the sexual relationship.99
2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Whereas a quid pro quo harassment claim can arise from one isolated incident
and revolves around the denial of a specific employment benefit, the hostile work
environment harassment claim usually requires a pattern of offensive conduct, in
part because it survives absent any direct effect on the employee's terms and condi-
tions of employment. 100 Simply put, the claim exists whenever an employer creates
or condones a substantially discriminatory work environment that unreasonably
interferes with the employee's work performance.1"1 Plaintiffs; however, gener-
ally posit both quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims in Title VII liti-
gation, because the failure to prove one assists, rather than defeats, evidence
supporting the existence of the other.
This cause of action was first recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Bundy v. Jackson,"0 2 a landmark case which relied extensively
on the legal precedent set by cases involving racially discriminatory environ-
97. Id. The court developed this distinction in order to explain the result reached by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Huebeschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983). In Huebes-
chen, a male employee became involved in a consensual relationship with his supervisor, but when the romance
soured, she retaliated by recommending his termination. Id. at 1169. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the dis-
crimination was directed at the employee, not because he was a man, but because he was the supervisor's former
lover. Id. at 1172. Thus, this did not constitute sex discrimination. Id.
98. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869. The court summarily rejected the argument that an employee who engaged
in consensual sex forever forfeited any right to legal protection from sexual harassment. Id. at 868.
99. Id. at 869. Although the federal district court in Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.
Ohio 1988), did not directly address this issue, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
plaintiffs sexual harassment claim where plaintiffs supervisor, with whom plaintiff had a previous consensual
relationship, withheld job performance and appraisals and told her that "it doesn't have to be this way." Id. at 777.
100. See MACINNON, supra note 2, at 40-47 (discussion of work-condition sexual harassment).
101. The constitutionality of hostile work environment claims was called into question by Justice White in his
concurring opinion in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). In R.A. V, the Supreme Court held that
a city's "hate-crimes" ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to engage in conduct or speech that tended to incite
immediate violence "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender" was facially invalid under the First
Amendment. According to the majority opinion, prohibiting speech on the basis of its subject matter, even when
the speech would not otherwise be constitutionally protected, violates the First Amendment. The Court, how-
ever, carved out exceptions to this general rule, which, as Justice White explained in his concurring opinion,
were deemed necessary in order to insulate Title VII hostile work environment claims from constitutional chal-
lenges under the Court's new holding. Id. at 2557-58. Justice White, however, disagreed with the majority's view
that the exception adequately protected such claims. Id.
102. 641 .2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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ments. 103 In particular, the Bundy court quoted Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 4 a case in which Judge Goldberg
determined that the plaintiffs employer had created an offensive work environ-
ment for its Hispanic employees by giving discriminatory service to Hispanic cli-
ents.
105
[T]he phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in [Title VII] is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination ....
One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimi-
nation as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers .... 106
After examining other cases chronicling similar discriminatory practices, 0 7 the
Bundy court asked: "How then can sexual harassment, which injects the most de-
meaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which always
represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy, not be ille-
gal?"
108
Although the disparate treatment analysis has been used to establish a prima fa-
cie case under this claim, the elements seem ill-equipped. Under a modified ver-
sion of the analysis, a claimant must show: (1) that the employee is a member of a
protected group; (2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances; (3) that the harassment was sex-based; and (4) that the harassment af-
fected or unreasonably interfered with a condition of employment. 10 9 The
103. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944; see Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977) (pattern of offensive ethnic slurs violates Title VII rights); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of
St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (segregated employee eating clubs violates Title VII); United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35 (W. D.N.Y. 1978) (black employees entitled to work environ-
ment free of racial abuse and insult); Steadman v. Handley, 421 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (racial slurs may
violate Title VII); see also EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381,385 (D. Minn. 1980)
(racial graffiti in restrooms, racial epithets on chalkboards, racial hostility in lunchroom created discriminatory
work environment). But see Winfrey v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 467 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Neb. 1979) (isolated
incident of foreman calling black plaintiff "boy" did not violate Title VII).
104. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
105. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236.
106. Id. at 238.
107. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944-45; see Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F2d 1028, 1032-33 &
n. 13 (7th Cir. 1979) (forcing female bank employees to wear uniforms while allowing males to wear suits violates
Title VII), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194
n.3 (6th Cir. 1978) (giving female physical education teachers inferior locker and shower facilities violates Title
VII), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979). But see Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 24 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (frequent use of sexually explicit language by male security traders not sexual harassment
since this was normal language of marketplace).
108. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945.
109. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,903-04 (1 th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968
(1992), noted that a prima facie case under the hostile environment theory is essentially the same as that under a
quid pro quo theory except for the fourth element, which involves job benefits conditioned on the acceptance of
equal favors. Id. In an earlier decision, Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987), the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the elements of a prima facie case in a hostle
environment claim, preferring instead to employ normal principles of proof allocation.
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disparate impact case has not yet been tried under this type of claim but arguably
might succeed if the employee could show: (1) that the employer tolerated a work-
ing environment in which lower echelon employees were subjected to sexual ad-
vances, and (2) that most of the lower echelon employees were female and most of
the superior employees, male. 
110
The United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 11 in its
first decision concerning sexual harassment, unanimously sanctioned the view
that a hostile work environment violates Title VII. 112 In Vinson, a female bank em-
ployee alleged that the bank's vice-president had fondled her, exposed himself to
her, assaulted her, forcibly raped her several times and had sex with her about
forty or fifty times during and after business hours.11 3 The employee had not suf-
fered any economic or tangible discrimination, but, nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that the evidence supported a claim of sexual harassment. 1 4 More spe-
cifically, the Court held that pervasive sexual harassment which alters a victim's
employment, including his or her psychological well-being, by creating an abusive
work environment, is actionable under Title VI. "1
A central issue in the Vinson case was the employer's defense that the plaintiff
consented to her supervisor's demands for sexual favors. 16 In support of its argu-
ment, the employer pointed to evidence that the plaintiff had voluntarily engaged
in sexual relations with her supervisor.' 17 However, the Vinson Court rejected this
argument, holding that sexual conduct need not be forced upon an employee to be
unwelcome, only offensive or undesirable. 1 8
Whether the employee viewed sexual conduct as unwelcome continues to be a
source of controversy in hostile work environment cases. In making this determi-
nation, courts will often focus upon the conduct of the alleged victim, because her
conduct in many circumstances will suggest whether the sexual comments were
welcome. A plaintiff who helps create a hostile work environment by making vul-
gar comments, for example, may not complain of sexual harassment because it is
not then deemed to have been offensive to her. 19 On the other hand, a few spo-
radic sexual comments by the plaintiff will not bar her claim. For example, in
H4erick v. Bayou Steel Corp. ,120 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a sum-
mary judgment award granted to the employer by the district court on the ground
110. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 206-07; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing tradi-
tional disparate impact analysis).
111. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
112. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63-66.
113. Id. at60.
114. Id. at65.
115. Id. at 67.
116. Id. at68.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 68. Apparently, there was very little evidence supporting claimant's allegations of repeated forcible
rapes. Id.
119. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (no hostile environ-
ment claim where plaintiff herself was participant in sexual innuendo and vulgar storytelling).
120. 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989).
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that the plaintiff had participated in the alleged harassment by making sexual com-
ments.121 The Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs limited remarks made
on three separate occasions and in response to an onslaught of sexual comments
and gestures were insufficient to establish her consent to the harassing work envi-
ronment. 122 Even if plaintiffs participation had been established, other court deci-
sions indicate that she could still have asserted a sexual harassment claim if she
could have shown with some precision a point at which she conveyed to the haras-
ser that she considered his conduct to be offensive. 123
a. Reasonable Woman Standard
The most controversial and most litigated element of hostile work environment
claims is the requirement that the harasser's conduct be sufficiently severe and
pervasive to alter the conditions of his victim's employment. 124 In evaluating the
harasser's conduct, courts have applied both an objective standard and a combined
objective and subjective standard.12 Adopting the objective perspective of a rea-
sonable person's reaction to a similar work environment has been deemed neces-
sary in order to protect employers from liability for claims brought by overly
sensitive plaintiffs.
Recently, however, some courts have rejected the "reasonable person" standard
and opted instead for an objective standard that views the conduct from the per-
spective of a person of the same sex as the victim, that is, from the perspective of
121. fWerick, 887 F.2d at 1275. Plaintiff admitted that she called a co-worker a "mother fucker" and "whore-
mongler" [sic] but only in response to his abusive statements. Id. at 1273 n.4.
122. Id. at 1275.
123. Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063
(1988).
124. Generally, isolated instances of abusive conduct in the workplace are insufficient to establish a violation.
See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (occasional use of obscenity and presence
of posters are not enough to affect psyches of female employees), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (one request to join supervisor at a restaurant after work and
his comments concerning desire to date plaintiff not sufficient to state a cause of action); Sapp v. City of Warner
Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (single request for date not actionable sexual harassment); Heelan v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978) ("cause of action does not arise from an isolated
incident or a mere flirtation . . . .[Miore properly characterized as an attempt to establish personal relation-
ships").
However, if sufficiently severe, one incident can constitute a violation. The EEOC, in its "Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment," states that a single, unusually severe incident of harassment may be suffic-
ient to constitute a Title VII violation. According to the EEOC, "the more severe the harassment, the less need to
show a repetitive series of incidents. This is particularly true when the harassment is physical." EEOC Policy
Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3112, at 3243 (Oct. 25, 1988);
see Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984) (harasser talked about sex and committed offen-
sive touching in a car from which plaintiff could not escape); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (plaintiff drugged and raped), affd, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cit. 1987).
125. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477
n.3 (5th Cit. 1989), reversed an employer's summary judgment award, noting that the alleged harassment would
have been highly offensive to any "reasonable person." On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,620 (6th Cit. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), affirmed a
lower court's judgment in favor of the employer, holding that in hostile environment cases a plaintiff must show
not only that the harasser's actions would have interfered with a reasonable person's work performance but that




either a "reasonable woman" or a "reasonable man." Of course, evaluating con-
duct from the victim's gender perspective will almost always require application of
a reasonable woman standard, since victims of sexual harassment are dispropor-
tionately female.126
The first decision to advocate acceptance of the reasonable woman standard is
Circuit Judge Damon Keith's dissenting opinion in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co. 127 In Rabidue, the majority held that a male co-worker's frequent obscenities
and sexually oriented poster displays did not create a hostile work environment. 128
Judge Keith disagreed with the majority's holding, and, in particular, disagreed
with the majority's adoption of the reasonable person standard in considering and
rejecting plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment.129 In his dissent, Judge Keith ar-
gued that "the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide diver-
gence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of
men." 3 ' On the other hand, adopting the perspective of the reasonable victim or,
in this case, the perspective of the reasonable woman would "simultaneously al-
low[] courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers
from the neurotic complainant." 3' Otherwise, according to Judge Keith, "courts
are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the
offenders, in this case men." 32
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ellison v. Brady,133 was the first court
explicitly to adopt the reasonable woman standard in determining the existence of
126. Since the primary reason for rejecting the reasonable person standard is because it is inherently male bi-
ased, there is probably little, if any, difference between that standard and the reasonable man standard. See infra
note 162. Viewing conduct from the victim's perspective is primarily an accommodation to female victims of
sexual harassment. Thus, the new trend is appropriately referred to solely as the "reasonable woman" standard.
127. 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U. S. 1041 (1987).
128. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. The co-worker, Doug Henry, routinely referred to women as "whores,"
"cunt[s]," "pussy," and "tits." Id. at 624. Henry specifically called plaintiff "fat ass" and on one occasion said,
"All that bitch needs is a good lay." Id. One of the sexually oriented posters displayed in a common area showed a
"prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling 'Fore.'"
Id.
129. Id. at 626.
130. Id. See also Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Ttle VII, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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a hostile work environment."3 4 In Ellison, the plaintiff, Kerry Ellison, and Sterling
Gray worked for the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") in San Mateo,
California.1 3 5 Ellison and Gray were not friends and did not work closely to-
gether. 131 In June 1986, Gray asked Ellison to lunch, and she accepted. 1 3 7 From
that date forward, Gray started pestering Ellison with unnecessary questions and
hanging around her desk.138 In October, Gray handed Ellison a note that read: "I
cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such
constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel
your hatred for another day.
13 9
Ellison contacted their supervisor, Bonnie Miller, who said that the note was
"sexual harassment," but Miller took no action because Ellison told her she wanted
to handle the situation herself. 4 ' Ellison then asked a fellow male employee to tell
Gray to leave her alone.14'
Thereafter, Ellison left California for a four-week training program in St.
Louis. 4 2 Shortly after she left, Gray sent a three-page letter to her in St. Louis that
she described as" 'twenty times, a hundred times weirder' "than his note.l" Gray
wrote, in part, "I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex. . . . I
have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching you. Experienc-
ing you from o [sic] so far away.""'
Ellison was frightened by the letter and thought Gray was "crazy."45 She imme-
diately telephoned Miller and requested that either she or Gray be transferred be-
cause she felt uncomfortable working in the same office with him.'46 That same
134. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637
(6th Cir. 1987), retreated from its earlier position in Rabidue by advocating the reasonable woman standard in a
constructive discharge case arising out of a supervisor's sexual harassment. Id. Citing the dissenting opinion in
Rabidue, the Yates court applied the reasonable woman standard in determining whether working conditions
were so intolerable that the plaintiff was reasonable in resigning her position. Id. For a full discussion of con-
structive discharge claims, see infra notes 166-87 and accompanying text.
Before the Ellison court rendered its decision, courts from other jurisdictions had adopted the reasonable
woman standard although none had done so with any meaningful discussion of the issue. See Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (to bring a successful sexual harassment claim for hostile work
environment, plaintiff must establish, among other things, that discrimination would affect a reasonable person
of the same sex in that position); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 852 n.7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that in evaluating a sexual harassment claim, a reasonable employee is one of the same sex as
the complainant). Nevertheless, the Ellison court was still the first to discuss the issue extensively and to apply the
reasonable woman standard to determine the existence of a viable hostile work environment claim.




139. Id. at 874. Ellison "became shocked and frightened and left the room."Id. Gray followed Ellison into the
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day, Miller met with Gray and ordered him to leave Ellison alone.147 Shortly be-
fore Ellison returned to San Mateo, Gray was transferred to the IRS's San Fran-
cisco office. 1"
After three weeks in San Francisco, Gray filed a union grievance requesting a
return to San Mateo.' 49 The IRS and the union settled the grievance in Gray's fa-
vor, and he was allowed to transfer back to San Mateo so long as he agreed not to
bother Ellison.150 Miller informed Ellison in a letter that Gray would return to the
San Mateo office and that management had resolved her problem by requiring that
Gray be separated from her for six months." 1
Ellison filed suit against the IRS for sexual harassment.152 The district court
granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment and Ellison appealed. 5 ' In deter-
mining whether Gray's conduct created a hostile work environment, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with decisions from other circuit courts that
rejected such claims because of a lack of psychological injury to the plaintiffs.154
The appropriate inquiry, according to the Ninth Circuit, focused not upon the ef-
fect of the harassing conduct on the victim, but upon the conduct itself.155 More
importantly, the conduct should be analyzed from the victim's perspective."' In
the instant case, for example, Gray's conduct, when viewed from his perspective,
could be considered isolated and trivial."' The court characterized Gray as a
"modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac," wooing Ellison with his words.58 On the
other hand, the court recognized that Ellison found Gray's conduct to be shocking
and frightening. "9 Viewed from her perspective as a reasonable woman, the court






151. Id. The letter promised that management would take additional action if the problem recurred. Id. Ellison
was 'frantic' upon being notified of Gray's pending return to San Mateo. Id. She filed a formal complaint of sexual
harassment with the IRS and obtained permission to transfer to San Francisco temporarily when Gray returned to
San Mateo. Id. While she was in San Francisco, Gray sent her another letter, although it is not clear whether
Ellison ever received it. Id. at 874-75.
152. Id. at 875.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 877-78. Specifically, the Ellison court disagreed with the standards set forth by the Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987) and Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986). In Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit
refused to find a hostile environment where the conduct was "not so startling as to have affected seriously the
psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in
Scott rejected the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim because the conduct did not cause such "anxiety and debili-
tation" to the plaintiff sufficient to" 'poison[]' "her working environment. Scott, 798 F.2d at 213.
155. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
156. Id.
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In adopting the reasonable woman standard, the court noted that women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, have a stronger incentive to
be concerned with sexual behavior, and understandably worry whether a haras-
ser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.'61 The court further
noted:
[A] sex-blind reasonable person tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically
ignore the experiences of women. The reasonable woman standard does not estab-
lish a higher level of protection for women than men. Instead, a gender-conscious
examination of sexual harassment enables women to participate in the work place on
an equal footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing the effects of sex-
ual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither
men nor women will have to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privi-
lege of being allowed to work and make a living." '162
Several recent decisions from other jurisdictions have adopted Ellison's stand-
ard for analyzing hostile environment claims.' 3 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, however, has not squarely addressed the issue, but in its most recent
decision on the matter, applied the traditional reasonable person test. 1
64
The implications of Ellison and other decisions adopting the reasonable woman
standard is that, at least in those jurisdictions, employers may no longer ignore or
excuse sexual conduct in the work place simply because it is inoffensive from a
male perspective. Instead, employers must consider whether such conduct would
be offensive from the perspective of a reasonable woman. If so, the employer
should take immediate remedial action to avoid liability under Title VI16
b. Constructive Discharge
The victim of a hostile work environment generally suffers no loss of compen-
sation as a result of sexual harassment.166 To the contrary, the victim in a quid pro
quo case suffers the loss of a tangible jobbenefit, such as a merit raise in salary. 67
Only the victim of quid pro quo harassment is, therefore, entitled to an award of
monetary damages for lost wages under Title VII. 16  The hostile environment
claimant, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,169 could obtain
only injunctive relief since there was no other equitable relief available under Title
161. Id. at 879.
162. Id. at 879-80 (citations omitted).
163. See, e.g., Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Ellison as support for
adopting reasonable woman's standard).
164. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992).
165. An employer's options upon being confronted with a potential claim of sexual harassment are discussed
below. See infra notes 379-91 and accompanying text.
166. For a full discussion of hostile environment harassment, see supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
167. For a full discussion of quid pro quo harassment, see supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
168.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (authorizing court to order whatever affirmative action may be appropri-
ate, including "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay").
169. Civil Rights Actof 1991, § 102,42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1992). The 1991 Civil Rights Act is discussed
at length below. See infra notes 155-310 and accompanying text.
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VII.17 However, if such a claimant could prove that she was constructively dis-
charged, that is, that she was forced to quit her job because of intolerable working
conditions, then she could seek damages in the form of backpay.17'
The doctrine of constructive discharge is not as important as it once was in sex-
ual harassment cases because Title VII was amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act
to allow claimants to seek compensatory and punitive damages unrelated to lost
wages. 172 Nevertheless, the doctrine is still significant for two reasons: first, the
1991 Civil Rights Act limits the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
that claimants may recover; 73 and second, most of the federal appellate courts that
have considered the issue have refused to apply the Civil Rights Act retroac-
tively.174 It is thus likely that the new damages provision will apply only to conduct
occurring after November 21, 1991, the date of the Act's enactment.17
There are two lines of authorities with regard to the proof necessary to establish
a constructive discharge. Under the first, the employer must render the working
condition intolerable for the specific purpose of forcing the employee to resign. 176
Under the second, the working conditions must be so unpleasant that a reasonable
employee would have felt compelled to resign.177 Under both lines of cases, how-
ever, it is generally agreed that a constructive discharge does not occur simply be-
cause an employee is required to work under discriminatory conditions. 7 '
Therefore, in order for a sexual harassment claimant to prove constructive dis-
charge, she must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment
than the minimum required to establish a hostile working environment.17
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, several federal circuit courts have held that nominal damages are
available under Title VII. See Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990); Huddleston v. Roger
Dean Chevrolet, 845 F.2d 900,905 (1 th Cir. 1988); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1983); T&F
Serv. Assocs. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 728 n.8 (Ist Cir. 1981). Other circuit courts have rejected the award of
nominal damages as relief in Title VII cases. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F2d 427, 428 (5th Cir.
1992); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986). Nominal damages are important
because of accompanying attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
171. See, e.g., Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975) (unless employee was constructively discharged, he would not be entitled to backpay).
172. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
173. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1981A(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
174. For a full discussion of the retroactivity issue, see infra notes 278-3 10 and accompanying text.
175. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (Supp. 1992).
176. See Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must show that employer delib-
erately rendered working condition intolerable to force him to quit); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d
923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (proof of constructive discharge requires proof of em-
ployer's intent to render job so unattractive so as to force employee's resignation).
177. Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, 807 F.2d 1536 (11 th Cir. 1987) (rejecting constructive discharge claim where
employee resigned one day after returning to work from pregnancy leave because she was demoted); Bourque v.
Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980) (considering issue of constructive discharge from perspec-
tive of reasonable employee).
178. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) ("proof of discrimination alone is not a
sufficient predicate fur a finding of constructive discharge" (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74
(D.C. Cir. 1981))); Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65 ("discrimination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay can-
not, alone, be sufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge").
179. See Landgraf 968 F.2d at 430.
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In addition, a constructive discharge is generally not shown, notwithstanding
the severity of the harassment, where an employer has taken immediate action to
alleviate the harassment.18 For example, in Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix
Corp. ,181 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the constructive discharge
claim of an employee who, twelve hours after she complained about a co-worker's
sexual harassment, was told by the company president that she would not have to
continue working with the alleged harasser except for the next two days.182 The
district court found the company's action to be insufficient and ruled that the em-
ployee's resignation effected a constructive discharge. 83 The Fifth Circuit Court
disagreed, stating that the company's remedy must be assessed proportionately to
the seriousness of the offense, which, in the instant case, was not as aggressive or
coercive as conduct that had occurred in other unsuccessful hostile environment
claims. 184 Concluding that the employer's remedy was prompt and, consequently,
that the claimant failed to act reasonably under the circumstances by refusing to
give her employer any opportunity to demonstrate its efforts to end the harass-
ment, the Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs claim for damages.185
3. Sexual Favoritism
Unlike quid pro quo and hostile environment claims, in the typical sexual favor-
itism case, the aggrieved employee is not herself subjected to sexual harassment,
but instead, a co-worker is granted a tangible job benefit in exchange for sexual
favors."18 According to the EEOC, such conduct violates Title VII.187 Specifically,
the EEOC Guidelines state:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's
submission to the employer's sexual advance or requests for sexual favors, the em-
ployer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.188
These Guidelines, at first blush, appear to encompass any and all sexual favoritism
in the workplace. In a recent policy statement, however, the EEOC has clarified
180. Id.
181. 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987).
182. Dornhecker, 828 F2d at 308. The plaintiff and her male co-worker were attending a series of out-of-town
presentations. Id. During the business trip, the co-worker put his hands on plaintiffs hips in an airport ticket line
and dropped his pants in front of other passengers; he touched plaintiffs breasts; playfully choked her at a busi-
ness dinner when she complained about his putting his stocking feet on the table; and on more than one occasion,
told plaintiff and others, "let's get naked and go to my room." Id. at 308 & n.2.
183. Id. at 310.
184. Id. at 309. For purposes of its decision, the court assumed, without deciding, that plaintiff was the victim
of a hostile work environment. Id. at 308.
185. Id. at 310.
186. See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C 1988); Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric
Ctr., 937 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1991).
187. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(g) (1982).
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its position on the matter, stating that it does not adopt such a broad view."8 9 In-
stead, it regards sexual favoritism in the workplace as constituting a viable cause
of action for the disgruntled employee only when it manifests itself as either im-
plicit "quid pro quo" harassment or "hostile work environment" harassment.19
The federal district court's decision in Broderick v. Ruder,191 provides the best
illustration of both types of harassment in preferential treatment cases. In Bro-
derick, the female plaintiff had been employed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as a staff attorney for more than eight years. 92 During the en-
tire period of her employment, she had received only one promotion, although she
had been eligible for more.193 Broderick introduced evidence at trial showing a
pervasive atmosphere of sexual harassment by persons in positions of manage-
ment, but failed to prove that any significant acts had been specifically directed at
her. 194 Instead, she was able to show only two isolated incidents of sexual harass-
ment, neither of which resulted in an explicit quid pro quo denial of employment
benefits: (1) that an office branch chief continually offered to drive her home dur-
ing her initial week on the job, and (2) that the regional administrator untied her
sweater and kissed her at an office party.1 95 However, she was able to prove that
two secretaries in the office had engaged in sexual affairs with their supervisors
and had received an inordinate number of promotions and cash awards. 96 In addi-
tion, a staff attorney who socialized extensively with another of Broderick's super-
visors had likewise received undue assistance in obtaining promotions. 9 7 These
consensual sexual relations, although not creating a cause of action for the two
secretaries and the staff attorney who did not view the sexual advances as unwel-
come, nevertheless, were deemed by the court to create a sexually hostile working
environment, thereby substantiating Broderick's cause of action.198
Although the Broderick court did not entertain the suggestion that the same set
of facts could also support an implicit "quid pro quo" harassment claim, the EEOC
insists in its policy statement that the court could have rested its holding on this
alternate theory of liability. 199 According to the EEOC, Broderick could have pre-
vailed on a quid pro quo claim because her supervisors demonstrated, by their
conduct, that job benefits would be awarded only to those female employees who
acquiesced to their sexual requests."' ° Implicit in this message was the understand-
189. EEOC Policy Statement, N-915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990), reprinted in [1989-1991 Transfer Binder] Emp.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 5248, at 6893.
190. Id.
191. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
192. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1270.
193. Id. at 1271.
194. Id. at 1273-75.
195. Id. at 1272-73.
196. Id. at 1274-75.
197. Id. at 1274.
198. Id. at 1277-78.
199. EEOC Policy Statement, N-915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990), reprinted in [1989-1991 Transfer Binder] Emp.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 5248, at 6897.
200. Id. at 6897.
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ing that females who did not respond favorably would not receive the same treat-
ment as those who did.201
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the existence of a quid
pro quo claim when more favorable job benefits are handed out to employees who
acquiesce to sexual conduct.20 2 In Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Center,203
the executive director of a geriatric center regularly hugged his female employees
and gave them back rubs.204 Many of these employees expressed concern to the
executive vice-president that their response to the executive director's physical
contacts might adversely affect their employment. 205 There was no evidence, how-
ever, that female employees who responded negatively to his conduct received re-
ductions in salary or any other loss of tangible job benefits. 206
On the other hand, there was evidence that the executive director and his secre-
tary shared a special relationship and that because of their relationship, he pro-
moted her to retirement administrator with a substantial raise in salary.20 7 In
addition, a comparison of yearly raises suggested that employees receptive to the
executive director's conduct received preferential treatment in the form of higher
raises.20 8 Citing the inadequacy of the record, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case
to the trial court for further findings on plaintiffs quid pro quo claim.20 9 In doing
so, the court implicitly recognized that plaintiffs allegation of sexual favoritism, if
true, could constitute a viable cause of action.
The impact of sexual favoritism claims, given the number of office affairs, is
tempered by the EEOC's recognition that an employer's isolated instances of pref-
erential treatment does not violate Title V11210 because, as stated previously, Title
VII does not protect employees from discrimination because of their sexual be-
havior. 1 Sexual harassment violates Title VII only when it constitutes gender-
201. Id.
202. Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1991).
203. Id.
204. Collins, 937 F.2d at 195. Not all the employees found this conduct objectionable, but, nevertheless, the
executive director's hugs were controversial and were frequently the subject of conversation among the employ-
ees at the center. Id.
205. Id. at 196.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 195-96. Witnesses testified at trial that they had observed the executive director and his secretary in
questionable circumstances. Id. at 195. There was evidence that the secretary's duties did not change after the
promotion. Id. at 196.
208. Id. at 196. In order to substantiate her claim that she, and other employees like her, would have received
higher raises had they been more receptive to the executive director, plaintiff questioned the center's personnel
director about the yearly raises of various employees. Id. The district court disregarded this evidence, implying
that plaintiffs comparison of salaries was inappropriate because the employees were not on the same departmen-
tal level. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred because it focused on the employees' yearly
income rather than on their yearly raises. Id. at 197 n. 19.
209. Id. at 197.
210. Moreover, according to the EEOC, because sexual harassment need not be directed at the aggrieved em-
ployee to state a cause of action under either type of harassment claim, both men and women have standing to
challenge sexual favoritism in the workplace, notwithstanding the gender of the employee submitting to the em-
ployer's requests for sexual favors. Id.
211. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
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based discrimination. Therefore, the EEOC contends, and it is generally agreed,
that an employer's favoritism toward his paramour, however unfair, does not vio-
late Title VII when it is not sex discrimination.212 For example, where favoritism is
granted to one individual and is based upon a consensual romantic relationship
with that individual, any employee disadvantaged by the denial of benefits given
instead to the employer's paramour is discriminated against not because of his or
her gender but because of the employer's personal preference for his paramour.213
Embracing this view, the district court in Miller v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica,214
refused to regard as sexual harassment plaintiffs allegation that her supervisor
treated her less favorably than her co-worker because the supervisor knew that her
co-worker had a romantic relationship with the plant manager.215 The court re-
garded the plaintiffs disadvantage in the workplace under those circumstances as
being shared by all male and female employees alie, that is, none could claim the
affections of the plant manager.216 Thus, there was no gender-based discrimina-
tion and, consequently, no Title VII violation.217
Likewise, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in DeCintio v. Westchester
County Medical Center,218 rejected similar claims by seven male respiratory thera-
pists alleging sexual harassment because they were denied a promotion granted to
the female paramour of the department administrator.219 Preferring a paramour for
job benefits did not fall within the purview of Title VII, because the preference
was not based on gender but on personal involvement.22
B. Liability of Employer for Sexual Harassment
Clearly, the employer cannot be held liable for all discriminatory acts encoun-
tered in the employment setting, but it is not always clear what the employer's re-
sponsibilities are. In this regard, courts and the EEOC Guidelines distinguish
between employer liability for acts of supervisors, nonsupervisory employees and
nonemployees. The distinction is necessary only in hostile environment harass-
ment cases since only supervisors are clothed with the authority to deny tangible
job benefits, a necessary element of quid pro quo harassment. The discussion that
-follows focuses upon the liability of "employers" in the narrowest sense of that
212. EEOC Policy Statement, N-915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990), reprinted in [1989-1991 Transfer Binder] Emp.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 5248, at 6894.
213. Id.
214. 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
215. Miller, 679 F Supp. at 501.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
219. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 305-06.
220. Id. at 308.
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term, although it should be noted that Title VII defines the term "employers" to
include management and supervisory personnel .221
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment by Supervisor
The 1980 EEOC Guidelines adopted a standard of strict liability for sexual har-
assment by an employer's agents and supervisory employees in both quid pro quo
and hostile work environment situations.222 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,223
the Supreme Court rejected this per se standard of liability for hostile work envi-
ronment harassment,224 but apparently accepted the view that employers are vicar-
iously liable for quid pro quo harassment. 22' Thus, this form of harassment is the
most potentially damaging to employers. The EEOC issued new guidelines in
1988 that conform to the Supreme Court's decision in Vinson on employer liability,
and maintain the position, as do most courts, that an employer is strictly liable for
its supervisor's quid pro quo harassment.226
2. Hostile Work Environment Created by Supervisor
Traditional agency principles are difficult to apply in hostile work environment
cases. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Vinson, most courts
have held that an employer becomes liable at the point when it either had actual or
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) (term "employer" includes agents of employer). For this reason, an em-
ployer and its harassing supervisor will often both be sued in the same action. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1991). Plaintiffs will be more likely to sue supervisors in
view of the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides for compensatory and punitive damages.
222.29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (c) (1989).
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship committee
or labor organization ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees
with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized
or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of
their occurrence. This Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employment rela-
tionship and the job junctions [sic] performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts
in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
Id.
223. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
224. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69-71. In Vinson, a hostile environment sexual harassment case, the defendant bank
claimed it should not be held liable because the acts of the purported harasser, an officer of the bank, were un-
known to the bank and done without its authorization. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' deci-
sion holding the bank strictly liable but in doing so, offered no definitive guidance except to agree that agency
principles should apply. Id. at 69-70, 72; see Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander, The Supreme Court Finally Speaks on
the Issue of Sexual Harassment- What Did It Say?, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 65 (1987). For a full discussion of
the Vinson decision, see supra notes I I 1-118 and accompanying text.
225. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72. In a quid pro quo case, the supervisor exercises the authority delegated to him by
his employer to fire or otherwise adversely affect the employment status of the harassed employee. Id. at 70. In
exercising this authority, the supervisor acts as his employer's agent for which the employer may be held vicari-
ously liable. Id. ; see Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title Vilfor Sexual Harassment After Meri-
tor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1258, 1270 (1987); see also Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l
Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986) (employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment).
226. EEOC Policy Guidance Memorandum on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) 3112, at 3253 (Oct. 1988). "[N]o matter what the employer's policy, the employer is always liable for
any supervisory actions that affect the victim's employment status. . . ." Id. at n.32.
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constructive knowledge of the harassment but failed to take appropriate corrective
action.227
A claimant can show actual notice, for example, by proving that she com-
plained to higher management.228 It is not necessary, however, that such notice be
provided through the employer's grievance procedures. A claimant can demon-
strate constructive notice by showing the pervasiveness of the harassment.229 In
either case, when a harassing work environment is created by an employer's super-
visor, rather than by an employee or non-employee, it is generally easier for the
claimant to prove that the employer had knowledge of the abusive conduct.230
Once knowledge is shown, an employer may avoid liability only if it can prove
that it took prompt and adequate steps to remedy the situation. Courts differ on
what action is sufficient and it seems likely that the answer will vary with the fac-
tual circumstances.
Generally, where the evidence shows that a supervisor has harassed his em-
ployees for several years with impunity, it is likely that the employer will be held
liable for not providing aprompt remedy even if the supervisor was later appropri-
ately disciplined for his conduct.231
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has not always been consistent in determin-
ing whether an employer's action is sufficiently prompt to avoid liability. For ex-
ample, in Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp. ,232 the Fifth Circuit held the company
liable for sexual harassment because its chief executive officer failed to have sex-
ual graffiti removed from the public men's room of a company's office building
until the day after he saw it when he learned that plaintiff had quit her job because
of it.233 On the other hand, in Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp.,234 the Fifth
227. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (rejecting strict liability
theory in pure hostile environment cases).
228. Waltman v. Intl Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989).
229. Id. at 478. In Watman, the majority held that sexual graffiti throughout the workplace constituted con-
structive notice of a hostile work environment. Id. Judge Jones, in her dissent, disagreed, arguing that the graffiti
was not directed specifically at the claimant and, moreover, that Title VII does not require employers to remove
all sexual graffiti from their establishments. Id. at 486.
The significance of constructive notice is that it allows employers to be held liable for sexual harassment in the
absence of actual notice. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72. It thus places a burden on employers to regularly audit their
workplace to detect and eradicate sexual harassment. See infra notes 380-91 and accompanying text (discussing
policies and procedures employers may take to mitigate potential liability).
230. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that it is easier to impute harassing
supervisor's knowledge to management).
231. Id. at 633. In Yates, the claimants' supervisor, Edwin Sanders, made frequent lewd jokes and comments,
regularly propositioned them, and invited them out to lunch, dinner and drinks. Id. at 632. The claimants' com-
plained to management in 1983, and after an internal investigation, the company drastically demoted Sanders.
Id. at 632-33. There was evidence, however, that Sanders had harassed other females employees as early as
1980, although the company failed to take any action. Id. at 635; cf Sappv. City of Warner Robins, 655 F. Supp.
1043, 1049-50 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (employer's prompt action to investigate allegations insulated it from liability
even if harassment was pervasive).
232. 845 E2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
233. Bennett, 845 F.2d at 105. The graffiti consisted of obscene cartoons bearing plaintiffs name which de-
picted her in "crude and deviant sexual activities." Id. Shortly after the incident, the company removed the chief
executive officer from his position. Id. at 106.
234. 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Circuit characterized as prompt an employer's response to complaints of sexual
harassment that required the victim to continue working closely with her harasser
for the next two days until the end of her business trip. 23 5 It is difficult to envision
why the facts of these two cases differ so significantly as to merit different out-
comes.
Even if an employer proves that it took prompt action in response to a complaint
of sexual harassment, it may still be held liable if the steps it took were inadequate
to resolve the situation. In this regard, an employer's anti-harassment policies and
procedures are relevant, but not conclusive, as to its liability. 236 An employer's pol-
icies and procedures, no matter how commendable, will be insufficient to insulate
an employer from liability if they are not properly implemented or if they function
ineffectively, because the reasonableness of an employer's chosen remedy will
likely always depend upon its ultimate ability to end the harassment. 237 The impor-
tance of an effective complaint procedure cannot be overstated. As the EEOC
stated in its 1988 Guidelines, "an employer can divest its supervisors of this appar-
ent authority [to commit hostile work environment harassment] by implementing a
strong policy against sexual harassment and maintaining an effective complaint
procedure." 238 There are no concrete rules regarding the effectiveness of an em-
ployer's procedures, but there are some general guidelines gleaned from court de-
cisions, which are discussed at length in the last section of this article.239
3. Hostile Work Environment Created by Nonsupervisory Employee
The discussion above applies equally well to the nonsupervisory employee
whose offensive conduct, like the conduct of a supervisory employee, cannot be
imputed to the employer unless the employer had actual or constructive knowledge
and failed to take corrective action .24 The EEOC Guidelines also adopt this posi-
235. Dornhecker, 828 F.2d at 308. Judge Jones, in her majority opinion, concluded that the company addressed
plaintiffs complaint promptly by assuring her twelve hours after she notified her immediate supervisor that it
would take action to remedy the situation. Id. at 309. Judge Jones further concluded that the length of time in
which the company proposed to resolve plaintiffs complaint was likewise prompt. Id.
236. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72-73. In Vinson, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that an employee's failure to
use an established grievance procedure precluded liability from attaching, especially since under the facts of that
case, the proper person to complain to was the accused harasser. Id.
237. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991). In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was
more appropriate to inquire as to the reasonableness of the remedy to stop the harassment, rather than as to what a
reasonable employer would do to remedy the harassment under similar circumstances. Id. at 882 & n. 17.
238. EEOC Policy Guidance Memorandum on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) 3112, at 3253 (Oct. 25, 1988). "When employees know that recourse is available, they cannot reasona-
bly believe that a harassing work environment is authorized or condoned by the employer." Id.
239. See supr notes 380-91 and accompanying text.
240. The federal district court in Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 461 F Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978) was the first
to hold an employer liable because of co-worker harassment. Id. at 949-50. The employer's supervisor had ig-
nored plaintiffs complaints, thereby exacerbating the situation. Id. at 935.
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tion and allow an employer to escape liability if he can prove that immediate and
appropriate action was taken to rectify the situation.241
Unlike situations where the hostile environment is created by a supervisor,
however, the aggrieved employee does not have a cause of action against the
harasser who, as a co-employee, is not a proper respondent under Title VII. 242
4. Hostile Work Environment Created by Non-Employee
The same principles of liability governing acts of nonsupervisory employees
equally apply to acts of nonemployees. Thus, the conduct of nonemployees cannot
be imputed to the employer unless the employer had actual or constructive knowl-
edge and failed to take corrective action. The EEOC Guidelines adopt this posi-
tion:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to
sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the
Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees 243
That the EEOC Guidelines expressly impose liability on the employer for the acts
of nonemployees indicates the seriousness with which the EEOC views sexual
harassment in the workplace.
In the seminal case on harassment by nonemployees, EEOC v. Sage Realty,2" a
female lobby attendant was fired because she refused 
to wear a revealing uni.
form. 24' The uniform, apparently designed in celebration of the Bicentennial, re-
sembled an American flag draped as a poncho.246 Underneath the poncho, the
lobby attendants wore only blue short pants and sheer stockings .247 During the two
days she wore the costume, the plaintiff was subjected to repeated sexual harass-
ment from the general public. 2  Specifically, the plaintiff was propositioned,
whistled at, and barraged with comments such as" 'I'll run it up the flag pole any
241. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (1982).
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer... knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Id; see Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (employer liable for co-worker harassment since
harassment brought to its attention but failed to take steps to end harassment); see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (to avoid liability, employer must do more than indicate existence of anti-harassment
policy).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). A non-supervisory employee is neither an employer nor an agent of the
employer.
243. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(e) (1982).
244. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
245. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 605, 607.
246. Id. at 604.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 605.
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time you want to.' "249 The court determined that by making her wear the sexually
provocative uniform, the employer forced her to acquiesce to the offensive behav-
ior and violated Title VII. 2S°
Many decisions holding an employer liable for sexual harassment based upon
the conduct of nonemployees involve an employer's dress requirements. Of
course, it is commonsensical that an employer would not be held liable for sexual
harassment by nonemployees outside the workplace."'
IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
On November 21, 1991, President George Bush signed the 1991 Civil Rights
Act into law. Acclaimed by many to be the most extensive legislation concerning
employment discrimination since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2"2 the new Act contains a far-reaching set of amendments to Title
VII, as well as to the Civil Rights Act of 1866,2"3 the Americans with Disabilities
Act2"4 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.25 These amendments also
249. Id. at 605 & n. 11. Arguably, if the attendants were not required to wear such revealing costumes and the
public still engaged in such sexual harassment, the employer would still be held liable under the EEOC Guide-
lines. One commentator suggests that the EEOC Guidelines thus go beyond the Sage Realty case and should hold
the employer responsible only where he ratifies the harassment or otherwise encourages or promotes it. See
McLain, supra note 65, at 327-28.
250. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 607-08.
251. Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F2d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (Title VII does not confer "obligation on employ-
ers to see to it that their employees are free of sexual harassment. . . by nonemployees outside the workplace"),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
253.42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870).
254.42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1990).
255.29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1990).
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specifically overrule seven fairly recent Supreme Court decisions" 6 that the civil
rights community had criticized as frustrating efforts to eradicate employment dis-
crimination.27 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 establishes a more liberal interpreta-
tion of discrimination law by greatly expanding the rights and remedies of alleged
victims of discrimination. A full analysis of the Act is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. What follows below is a brief discussion of only those provisions of the Civil
Rights Act that bear directly on sexual harassment law.
Perhaps the most important provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to victims of
sexual harassment is section 102,2"8 which allows plaintiffs to recover both com-
pensatory and punitive damages under Title VII in cases of intentional discrimina-
256. The holdings of these decisions and the impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act are briefly, as follows:
In West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1139 (1991), the Supreme Court held
that prevailing parties in federal employment discrimination actions are limited to $30 per day in their recovery
of expert witness fees. The Court determined that such fees were not part of a litigant's attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrules this decision by providing that the ability to recover
attorney's fees includes the fees of experts. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (Supp. 1992)
(applying only to cases arising under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 1227 (1991), the Supreme Court held that Title VII did not
apply to employment practices of American businesses occurring outside the United States. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 overrules this decision by extending Title VII to cover discrimination by American employers with busi-
nesses in a foreign country but only if compliance would not cause the employer to violate the law of the foreign
country. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. 1992).
The Supreme Court held in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), that the limitations
period in cases involving the application of a facially neutral seniority system starts to run from the time when the
system was adopted, rather than from the time the system adversely affects the plaintiff. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 overrules Lorance by providing that a challenge to an allegedly discriminatory seniority system may be
brought within the limitations period beginning either from the time the system was adopted, the time when the
plaintiff became subject to the system or the time when the plaintiff was injured by application of the system.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Supp. 1992).
In Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), the Supreme Court held that individuals adversely affected by the
affirmative action provisions of a consent decree entered in a proceeding in which the individuals were not par-
ties or intervenors may challenge that decree in a separate proceeding. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrules
Martin by limiting collateral challenges to current decrees to a narrow group of individuals. Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (Supp. 1992).
The Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), held that in disparate impact
cases (1) plaintiffs must identify the specific employment practice that causes the disparity and (2) in defense of a
disparate impact claim, employers need only show that the practice serves legitimate business goals. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 relieves plaintiffs of the burden of identifying the specific employment practice that causes the
alleged disparity in cases where the practice is not subject to separation from the overall decision-making process
and also requires, once a disparity is established, employers must prove that the practice is job related and con-
sistent with business necessity.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Court held in cases where discrimination is a moti-
vating factor in an adverse employment action, the employer may escape liability by showing that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of discrimination. The Civil Rights Act overrules Hopkins by providing that
in such cases, otherwise known as mixed-motive cases, the employer may be held liable for the plaintiffs attor-
ney's fees and costs but not for backpay or other monetary damages. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(b), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1992).
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court held that discrimination in
promotions, discharge and other employment conditions is not actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which applies only to the making and enforcing of private employment contracts. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 overrules this decision by defining the term "make and enforce contracts" so as to include the
performance and termination of contracts. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) (Supp.
1992).
257. See Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A. Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Overview and Analysis, 8
LAB. LAW. 9 (1992).
258. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(l) (Supp. 1992).
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tion.2"9 Before this amendment, a prevailing plaintiff under Title VII could recover
only equitable relief, such as lost wages and reinstatement. 2 60 A major reason for
broadening Title VII's remedies was the availability of compensatory and punitive
damages in race and ethnic discrimination cases under the Civil Rights Act of
1866.261 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, does not place sexual harassment
victims in parity with racial discrimination victims because the Act imposes a lim-
itation on the sum of compensatory and punitive damages based on the number of
employees, as follows:
Number of Maximum Amount of Compensatory




More than 500 $300,000262
On March 11, 1992, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee ap-
proved legislation introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy that, if enacted, would
remove this provision of the 1991 Act.263
By allowing Title VII claimants to recover damages unrelated to the loss of
compensation, the new damage provision becomes particularly important to vic-
tims of a hostile work environment. Previously, in the absence of constructive dis-
charge, the plaintiff could obtain only injunctive relief under Title VII and no
compensation for economic losses.2' Also previously, to recover compensatory
and punitive damages, the victim of sexual harassment was forced to combine her
employment discrimination claim with state causes of action, such as assault and
battery.265 The 1991 Act now makes joinder of state law claims less important but
not obsolete since there are no damage limitations for state law claims.
259. Id.
260.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1964).
261.42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
• * * as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Id. The Supreme Court held in its landmark decision of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975), that section 1981 prohibits discrimination in private employment based on race and that, with a proper
showing, compensatory and punitive damages are available for recovery. The Supreme Court noted in another
decision in dicta that the same act does not apply to discrimination based upon sex. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976). The result was that race discrimination plaintiffs brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
rather than Title VII, because of the more favorable remedies. Sex discrimination plaintiffs did not have this al-
ternative avenue of legal redress, but were limited to the recovery available under Title VII.
262. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3) (Supp. 1992). Specifically, the limita-
tion applies to damages "for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." Id. Accordingly, it does not apply to past pecuniary
losses.
263. Equal Remedies Act of 199 1, S. 2062, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Sen. Kennedy agreed in legislative
negotiations to limit the damages under the 1991 Act but vowed to lift the limitations in separate legislation.
264. See supra notes 166-87 and accompanying text (discussing constructive discharge claims).
265. See infra notes 308-42 and accompanying text (discussing potential state tort claims).
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Under the Act, the standard for punitive damages is that "the respondent en-
gaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individ-
ual. "266 It should be noted that in no event are punitive damages available from a
government, government agency or political subdivision.267 With regard to puni-
tive damages, the conduct of an employer after receiving notice of sexual harass-
ment in his work force becomes particularly important. An employer's failure to
adopt or implement an effective sexual harassment policy makes it more vulnera-
ble to punitive damages.268
Neither punitive nor compensatory damages are available under the new Act to
an individual who can recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.26 Accordingly, the Act
states that none of its provisions are to be construed as limiting the scope of, or the
relief available, under section 1981.27 In addition, these damages are available
only in intentional discrimination cases, thus excluding disparate impact claim-
ants.271 Finally, the 1991 Act specifically provides that juries are not to be in-
structed about the limitations on compensatory and punitive damages.272
Presumably, courts will reduce jury verdicts in excess of the limitations to con-
form with the statute.
The provision for jury trials is perhaps the second most important section of the
1991 Act to victims of sexual harassment. Before November 21, 1991, jury trials
were not available to claimants seeking relief under Title VII. 27a Under the 1991
Act, if compensatory and punitive damages are requested by the plaintiff, either
party may request a trial by jury.274 The significance of a jury trial to sexual har-
assment plaintiffs cannot be overstated. Many juries may be more sympathetic to
the plight of sexual harassment victims than judges. Finally, the unpredictability
ofjuries places defendants in a much greater dilemma in attempting to evaluate the
risk of trying rather than settling cases.
A central issue in litigation involving the 1991 Civil Rights Act is whether it
applies to cases pending at the time of its enactment on November 21, 1991, or to
cases that arise from conduct committed before that date. The position of the
EEOC, at least with regard to the damages provision of the Act, is that the Act
266. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(1) (Supp. 1992).
267. Id.
268. See infra notes 380-91 and accompanying text for practical suggestions to avoid liability.
269. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(l) (Supp. 1992).
270. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(4) (Supp. 1992).
271. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (provision does not apply
to employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact); see supra notes 100-23 and accompany-
ing text.
272. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(c)(2) (Supp. 1992).
273. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (suggesting that jury trials are not required under Title VII).
Because Title VII provided for equitable, and not legal, relief, the overwhelming weight of authority had held that
there was no right to ajury trial. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 E2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
274. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(c) (Supp. 1992).
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does not apply retroactively.27 In reaching this decision, the EEOC noted that
section 402(a)276 of the Act, which sets forth the effective date of the Act, could be
construed in two ways. Section 402(a) states: "Except as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon en-
actment."277 The EEOC interpreted this provision as meaning either (1) that the
Act applies to any and all charges or cases pending on or after November 21, 1991
or (2) that the Act applies only to conduct occurring after November 21, 1991 278
The EEOC concluded that the above provision was ambiguous despite two
other sections of the Act that created specific exemptions for pre-Act conduct.279
Section 109(c)28 of the Act, which extends Title VII and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act281 coverage to American citizens working in foreign countries for
American companies, states that it "shall not apply with respect to conduct occur-
ring before the date of the enactment of this Act." '282 Section 402(b) of the Act pro-
vides that "nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which
complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was
rendered after October 30, 1983."28 This latter provision was enacted to assure
that the employer in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,284 would not be subjected
to the Act's new standards governing disparate impact cases.28 Although the
EEOC acknowledged that inclusion of the above two sections suggested that the
remaining provisions have retroactive application, it nonetheless concluded that
any inference so raised was rebutted by the legislative history of the Act which
contained divergent views on the subject.286
Finally, after reviewing and noting a conflict in Supreme Court precedent on
the question of retroactive application of legislation, the EEOC decided it would
follow the Supreme Court's most recent holding on the issue, Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital,287 and not seek damages in charges filed before enactment of
275. EEOC Policy Guidance N-915.002, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5329 (Dec. 27, 1991). The Department
of Justice has also taken the position that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Van
Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991).
276. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. 1992).
277. Id.
278. EEOC Policy Guidance N-915.002, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5329, at 6056 (Dec. 27, 1991).
279. Id.
280. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. 1992).
281.42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1990).
282. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 19(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (Supp. 1992).
283. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. 1992).
284. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
285. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Legislation was
approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on March 11, 1992, that would remove this
particular ban on retroactivity from the law. See Justice for Wards Cove Workers Act, S. 1962, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992).
286. Compare 137 CONG. REc. S 15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth that Act does
not apply to cases before enactment of the Act) with 137 CoNG. REc. S 15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy that under Supreme Court precedent, courts usually apply newly enacted legislation to
pending cases).
287. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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the Act or in charges filed after the enactment of the Act that challenged pre-Act
conduct. 288
Decisions from the United States Supreme Court uniformly hold that the plain
language of a statute and its legislative history determine whether it should be ap-
plied retroactively. 289 In the absence of clear congressional intent, however, the
question is not easily resolved because the Supreme Court has issued two incon-
sistent lines of cases on the matter. The earlier decision, Bradley v. School
Board,290 holds that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory di-
rection or legislative history to the contrary."291 The other decision, Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital292 holds that "congressional enactments and ad-
ministrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their lan-
guage requires this result." 293 As may be recalled, when the EEOC issued its
policy statement concluding that the agency would not apply the Act retroactively,
it did so reasoning that Bowen was the Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment on the retroactive application of legislation. 94
Recognizing this irreconcilable conflict in Supreme Court precedent, Justice
Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v. Bon-
jorno,29 s urged the Court to resolve the issue.296 Unfortunately, however, the con-
flict remains. Predictably this conflict has resulted in inconsistent decisions from
federal appellate courts that have grappled with the issue of whether to apply the
1991 Civil Rights Act to conduct occurring before the date of the Act's enactment.
As of the time of the writing of this article, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Bowen and the EEOC's
interpretation of the Act, have refused to apply the Act retroactively. 297 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals so far has been the only appellate court to rule to the con-
trary. 98 Notwithstanding this lack of consensus on the issue, the Supreme Court
288. EEOC Policy Guidance N-915.002, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5329, at 6058 (Dec. 27, 1991).
289. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
290. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
291. Brad/ey, 416 U.S. at 711.
292. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
293. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
294. EEOC Policy Guidance, N-915.002, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5329, at 6058 (Dec. 27, 1991).
295. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
296. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring).
297. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594
(6th Cir. 1992); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald
Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Generally
courts that have refused to apply the Act retroactively have followed Bradley.
298. Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549-56 (9th Cir. 1992). As mentioned previ-
ously, two other sections of the Act, §§ 109(c) and 402(b), carve out exceptions for certain parties in actions
pending at the time of the Act's enactment.
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has declined to grant certiorari on the matter, although it has had numerous oppor-
tunities to do so.2 99
In its first decision addressing the issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is-
sued a decision refusing to apply section 101 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,300
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to a case that, at the time of the Act's enactment, was
pending on appeal. In Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc. ,301 the court noted as a prelimi-
nary matter, as did the EEOC, that the language of the Act offered no guidance on
the issue. 3 2 The court specifically rejected the contention that sections 402(b) and
109(c), because they specifically prohibit retroactive application in certain cate-
gories of cases, would be rendered meaningless if the Act were applied prospec-
tively only. 33 Such an analysis, according to the Fifth Circuit, rested too much on
negative implication. °
The court then described the conflicting lines of authority from the United
States Supreme Court and finally concluded that it would "follow the canon that
statutes affecting substantive rights 'are ordinarily addressed to the future and are
to be given prospective effect only.' "303 By noting that the amendment affected the
substantive rights of the parties, the court, by implication, indicated that it may
treat procedural provisions of the Act differently. However, in its most recent deci-
sion on the matter, Landgraf v. USI Film Products,"6 the Fifth Circuit relied al-
most entirely on its opinion in Johnson to reach the conclusion that the jury and
damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act do not apply retroactively. 307
V. OTHER POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTIoN
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII does not supplant state law. 30' Thus, even though employers may es-
cape liability under Title VII, they may still be vulnerable to the risk of large dam-
age awards for the same conduct under state law. State causes of action become
particularly important to the aggrieved employee in view of the 180-day time per-
iod in which an employee must file a Title VII claim with the EEOC. °9 Thus, in
299. E.g., Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv., 59 Emp. Prac. Dec. 41,781 (Oct. 5, 1992). How-
ever, in response to petitions for certiorari review, the Supreme Court has vacated appellate court decisions for
reconsideration in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Holland v. First Va. Banks, Inc., 58 Emp. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 41,301 (1992); Gersman v. Group HealthAss'n, 58 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,300 (1992); Hicks v.
Brown Group, Inc., 58 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,299 (1992).
300. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 101,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1992).
301. 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992).
302. Johnson, 965 F.2d at 1373.
303. Id. This argument prevailed in Stender v. Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
304. Johnson, 965 F.2d at 1373. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the retroactivity issue proved too controversial
for Congress to resolve and that the two provisions precluding retroactive application implied nothing about ap-
plication of other provisions of the Act. Id.
305. Johnson, 965 F2d at 1374.
306. 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992).
307. Landgraf 968 F.2d at 432-33; see Valdez v. San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592,595 (5th
Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson and Landgraf.
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
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cases where a Title VII claim may be time-barred because of the statute's rela-
tively short limitations period, an employee may still seek damages from her em-
ployer using state remedies. 31
Nevertheless, causes of action for sexual harassment under state law have lost
some of their significance because of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which now pro-
vides for broader, although not unlimited, damages and, in addition, a trial by
jury.311 Before the Act, Title VII did not allow litigants to recover compensatory or
punitive damages and did not allow trial by jury. 12 Therefore, previously, in order
to obtain larger damage awards claimants generally alleged one or more state
causes of action in addition to their Title VII claims.33 State law claims, however,
will remain important, unless and until Congress removes limitations on Title VII
damage awards.3 14
A. Common Law Tort Claims by
Harassed Employee Against Employer
Under Mississippi law, an employer may be held liable for the intentional acts of
its employees "if the employer either authorized the act prior to or ratified the act
after its commission, or the act was committed within the scope of employ-
ment." '  Although normally an employer would not authorize sexual assaults or
other forms of harassment by its employees, an employer may nevertheless ratify
such conduct by failing to take appropriate disciplinary action after learning of the
harassment. If so, the acts of the employee may be imputed to the employer.
316
A closer question is whether harassment by an employee can be held to be in the
course of, and in furtherance of, his employment. An employee does not necessar-
ily act outside the scope of his employment when he commits an intentional tort or
criminal act.317 Therefore, the answer to this question will depend on the specific
factual situation, such as whether the acts occurred in the workplace and during
normal working hours, and whether the purpose of the harassment was to further
310. In Mississippi, a litigant will often have twice as long a period of time to file a state claim as she does a
Title VII claim. Section 15-1-35 of the Mississippi Code provides a one-year limitation period for certain inten-
tional torts such as assault and defamation. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1992). According to the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court, the section provides "an inclusive listing of the recognized intentional torts ...."
Southern Land & Resources Co. v. Dobbs, 467 So. 2d 652, 654 (Miss. 1985) (quoting Dennis v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 234 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1970)). Thus, the list is not exhaustive and will govern many of the state claims
discussed in this section.
311. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1992). For a full discussion of the impact of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see supra notes 252-307 and accompanying text.
312. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3) (Supp. 1992).
313. Litigation of state claims in a federal forum requires pendent jurisdiction, which exists so long as the plain-
tiff can show that the state and Title VII causes of action are so related "that they form part of the same case or
controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. 1991) (providing for supplemental jurisdiction).
314. See supra note 263.
315. Thatcher v. Brennan, 657 F. Supp. 6, 8 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
316. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir.
1981).
317. Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd. v. Independent Ref. Co., 783 F2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the employer's interest rather than solely to satisfy the employee's own personal
objectives.
The purpose of the following discussion is to acquaint employers with common
law tort claims that may arise out of incidents of sexual harassment. It is not in-
tended to provide an exhaustive survey of tort law.
1. Assault and Battery
Any unpermitted physical contact by an harasser with his victim that is offen-
sive or insulting, whether it is also physically harmful, may give rise to a cause of
action for battery.318 To be liable, the accused need not intend to cause physical
injury, only to bring about the offensive contact.3 19 Actions such as hitting an em-
ployee across her bottom,32 fondling her breast,321 and pulling her hair 322 consti-
tute a battery.
Assault is a tort that protects a person's interest in freedom from apprehension
of a harmful or offensive contact with the person. 23 In an assault, no physical con-
tact need occur, but the victim must reasonably believe that such contact is cer-
tain. 24 Usually, however, words alone are insufficient to support a cause of action
for assault and, thus, verbal acts of sexual harassment, in the absence of a gesture
or movement toward the woman, will not give rise to liability.325 On the other
hand, an accused's threats combined with some overt act which frightens the vic-
tim of sexual harassment will constitute an assault.3 26
The two torts of assault and battery may be combined in sexual harassment
cases involving physical as well as verbal acts by supervisors. Notably, under Mis-
sissippi law, in such cases, punitive damages may be awarded if the assault was
malicious, and malice may be presumed solely from the manner in which the as-
sault was made.327
318. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965); see Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp.
523, 529 (D.D.C. 1981).
319. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
320. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1527 (1 th Cir. 1983) (affirming award of
damages in sexual harassment case for pendent claim of battery where employer locked plaintiff in his office,
insisted she engage in oral sex with him at least three times a week and hit her across her bottom as she was leav-
ing his office).
32 1. Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (employer committed
assault and battery when he put his hand under employee's coat and fondled her breast).
322. Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529 (D.D.C. 1981) (allegations that employer
pulled employee's hair while attempting to convince her to spend the night with him were sufficient to survive
motion to dismiss on battery claim).
323. W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984).
324. See id.
325. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1965); see Johnson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 228
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1955) (abusing, insulting and cursing an individual does not constitute cognizable cause of
action).
326. See W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984).
327. Roberts v. Pierce, 398 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1968).
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2. Invasion of Privacy
A harasser's unprivileged intrusion into the sexual concerns of his victim may
constitute an invasion of privacy. This tort arises when a person intentionally in-
trudes, physically or otherwise, upon the private affairs or concerns of another
and the intrusion would be highly offensive to a "reasonable person.'328 Generally,
however, there must be a pattern of harassment or a communication of an ex-
tremely vicious nature329
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc. ," for example, the court
found that an employer's continual interrogations about his employee's sex life,
which caused the woman to suffer from chronic anxiety, constituted an invasion of
privacy.3 31 Also, in Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel,332 the federal district
court concluded that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor frequently called
her at home to make sexual advances and to comment about her sexual life were
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
333
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Mississippi, as in most otherjurisdictions, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous conduct that causes severe
emotional distress .33' This cause of action does not extend, of course, to mere in-
331sults, indignities or annoyances.
Sexual harassment in the workplace, because of the threat of economic coer-
cion as a consequence of the victim's employment position, can almost always be
viewed as constituting outrageous conduct. 3 In a case where the cause of action
was held to exist, the aggrieved manager of a hotel-restaurant alleged that her im-
mediate supervisor made sexually oriented advances toward her, wrote her notes
and letters that he placed inside menus or in her purse, used abusive language, be-
littled her in the presence of other employees, and, finally, advised her that he
would do everything in his power to have her fired from her position. 3 7
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
329. Burrie v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 540 F Supp. 905 (S.D. Miss. 1982) (harassment by telephone).
330. 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
331. Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 708-09. The employer, inter alia, asked his employee how often she and her hus-
band had sex and what positions they used. Id. at 707. After certifying the state law claims to the Alabama Su-
preme Court, the 11 th Circuit affirmed the district court jury award of $25,000 in compensatory damages.
Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1532.
332. 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981).
333. Rogers, 526 F. Supp. at 528. But see Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F2d 1311, 1315 (11 th Cir.
1989) (11 th Circuit rejected invasion of privacy claim where sexual remarks were not sufficiently published).
334. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963).
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
336. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
[WIhere there is a special relation between the parties. . . there may be recovery for insults not amount-
ing to extreme outrage . . . .The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an
abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority
over the other, or power to affect his interests.
Id. at cmts. (d) and (e).
337. Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 E Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981).
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Aside from being held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, an em-
ployer may be held directly liable for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress for failing to take appropriate action to end a harasser's conduct. For
example, in Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co. ,338 an employee was awarded $45,000 in
actual damages and $45,000 in punitive damages because her employer ignored
her complaints of harassment.339 In Baker, although the employer disciplined one
of its employees for sexually harassing another employee in 1986, it later trans-
ferred the accused to a work assignment where the plaintiff was his subordinate
and where, from January 1987 until July 1987, the accused subjected the grievant
to explicit and repeated sexual harassment.3 40 Although plaintiff complained to her
supervisor in January 1987, the employer did not take action until July 1987 when
it terminated the accused's employment.3 4' Nevertheless, because the employer
knew that its employee was harassing others between the time the employee
should have been fired and was fired and because, therefore, the employer "per-
mitted a known sex maniac to run amok in the workplace," the employer was held
directly liable for its outrageous conduct. 42
B. Common Law Tort Claims by Alleged
Harasser Against Employer
As discussed at length above, an employer's failure promptly and adequately to
investigate and resolve complaints of sexual harassment may expose it to Title VII
liability and to tort liability as a result of actions brought by the harassed employee.
In addition, however, the employer may encounter tort liability as a result of
claims brought by the accused harasser. Such claims, referred to as "reverse" dis-
crimination claims, arise, if at all, because of the manner in which the employer
conducts its investigation. In this regard, a written sexual harassment policy set-




An employer who publicly accuses an employee of sexual misconduct during
the investigation of the harassed employee's allegations, or in the aftermath of dis-
ciplinary proceedings against the alleged harasser, may be sued by the harasser for
defamation. Sexual harassment in the workplace provides titillating conversation
and employees will naturally be interested in hearing about the plight of a co-
worker disciplined for such conduct. Indeed, to defend a hostile environment har-
assment claim, an employer may be required to respond to its employee's concerns
by issuing an official anti-harassment policy. In doing so, an employer may feel
338. 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990).
339. Baker, 903 F.2d at 1343.
340. Id. at 1345.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1348.
343. See infra notes 378-90 and accompanying text.
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obliged to reveal allegations made against its disciplined employees. If it does so,
it risks exposure to liability for defamation.
A defamatory communication is one which tends to injure a person's reputa-
tion, thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. 3" The ele-
ments of this tort are: (1) the publication of a falsehood, (2) to a third party, (3)
with malice, (4) resulting in damages. 45 Mississippi law, however, recognizes a
qualified privilege in the employer-employee context against defamation claims as
a matter of public policy. 346 A communication is privileged, that is, will not ex-
pose the employer to liability even though it otherwise would be considered de-
famatory if: (1) it is made in good faith and without malice; (2) it is on a
subject-matter in which the person making it has an interest and (3) it is made to a
person or person having a corresponding interest or duty.347 As a matter of law,
statements made by employers to employees on issues of common interest are
privileged. 3' Because employers and employees share a common interest in eradi-
cating hostile or offensive work environments, statements about the employer's
decision to discipline an employer for sexual harassment may fall within this privi-
lege. Indeed, in view of the EEOC Guidelines suggesting that employers raise the
subject of sexual harassment with their employees, it can hardly be said that such
occasions do not merit the shield of privilege.
Problems in this context nevertheless arise because an employer may abuse the
privilege, such as, for example, when the scope of an employer's statements ex-
ceed what is necessary to protect its interests or when statements are communi-
cated to persons outside the circle of individuals who have a common interest in
the subject matter. In such cases, the privilege is lost.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garziano v. E. L Du Pont De Nemours &
Co. ,34 rendered the seminal case on this issue. In Garziano, an employer, in re-
sponse to rumors and questions circulating at its plant after the dismissal of one of
its employees for sexual harassment, issued a bulletin referring to the incident as a
serious act of employee misconduct.5 The bulletin was distributed in envelopes
to 140 supervisors with instructions to cover the key points in the bulletin with
their employees.351 Some supervisors read it verbatim and others summarized it,
but none distributed it to their employees or posted it on a bulletin board.
352 Al-
though the bulletin did not mention the discharged employee's name, his identity
344. Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 275 (Miss. 1984).
345. Id. at 277.
346. Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 157 So. 705 (Miss. 1934) (leading case on existence of qualified privilege
in employer-employee context).
347. Id. at 708.
348. Bush v. Myelin, 478 So. 2d 313, 314 (Miss. 1985).
349. 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
350. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 383-84.
351. Id. at 384.
352. Id.
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was nevertheless clear. 3 The employee sued his former employer for defama-
tion.35 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the bulletin was issued on
an occasion of qualified privilege and, moreover, that the language did not exceed
the scope of the privilege, in part, because the bulletin neither described the al-
leged sexual harassment in detail nor attempted to characterize the harasser's con-
duct other than in terms used in the EEOC Guidelines .3 However, the court
regarded as a factual issue the question of whether the qualified privilege was
abused by excessive publication .356 Even though the employer used the most re-
strictive means of communication to inform its supervisors of its position on the
matter, there was evidence indicating that some supervisors had disseminated the
information to nonemployees who clearly would not be covered by the scope of the
privilege. 7
2. Invasion of Privacy
Because the tort of invasion of privacy has been discussed previously, it suffices
to say here only that an employer's investigation into allegations of sexual harass-
ment must be so overreaching as to constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the
accused's private sexual affairs for a cause of action to exist. In this regard, an em-
ployer's written policy stating that all sexual harassment claims will be thoroughly
investigated may constitute a legal defense of consent. 8
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under the same requisites discussed previously, an accused harasser may assert
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as the result of the employer's
investigation into a co-worker's allegations of offensive sexual conduct. For exam-
ple, in Martin v. Baer,319 two female employees accused Robert Martin of sexual
harassment, but Martin's employer refused to conduct a formal investigation into
the matter despite Martin's repeated demands that it do so. 360 Martin apparently
believed that a full investigation would clear him of all charges. 361 The investiga-
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 384, 387,391.
356. Id. at 394.
357. Id. at 393-94. The privilege was not abused so long as the supervisors did not discuss the contents of the
bulletin with anyone other than employees, even if the employees subsequently discussed the bulletin with non-
employees. Id. at 395.
358. See, e.g., Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (all calls on cus-
tomer service lines were known to be monitored; therefore, the monitoring of a personal phone call made on the
customer service line was not an invasion of privacy), affd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
359. 928 F.2d 1067 (1 lth Cir. 1991).




tion that did ensue resulted in an inconclusive determination362 Martin sued his
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress but was unsuccessful be-
cause the conduct of his employer was not deemed by the court to be sufficiently
outrageous 363
C. Mississippi's Workers' Compensation Act
as a Defense
Workers' compensation rests on the economic principle that the cost of work-
related injuries should be passed along in the cost of the employer's product. Under
this scheme of compensation, a disabled employee is compensated for lost wages
and medical expenses that arise out of and in the course of employment without
regard to fault as to the cause of injury. 64 In exchange, the employee gives up his
right to seek tort damages against his employer on account of such injury.36
Arguably, workers' compensation is the employee's sole remedy for emotional
injuries sustained as a result of sexual harassment arising out of and in the course
of employment. If so, all common law tort claims, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, would be precluded under the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers' Compensation statute. 366 The Mississippi Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed this precise issue, and when brought before the federal district courts, the
issue has been evaded altogether by the dismissal of all pendent state law claims.367
Moreover, courts from other jurisdictions are not in agreement on the matter.368
Under Mississippi law, injury to an employee from the intentional acts of a third
person is compensable if it is directed against the employee because of his employ-
ment and while so employed and working on the job .36' The Mississippi Supreme
Court defines the term "third person" as meaning either a stranger to the employer-
employee relationship or a co-employee acting outside the scope and course of his
employment."' If the result of a personal vendetta, a co-employee's intentional
tort has no rational connection to employment and thus is not barred under the ex-
clusivity provisions of workers' compensation. On the other hand, where an em-
362. Id. The extent of the investigation that was conducted was disputed. Id. at 1069 n.6. Martin argued that
his employer failed to act for five months and did not interview an eyewitness until almost one year after the inci-
dent occurred. Id.
363. Id. at 1073-74.
364. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (Supp. 1992).
365. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (Supp. 1992).
366. Id.
367. Fowler v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Miss. 1991).
368. Compare Garvey v. Dickinson College, 761 F Supp. 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress not barred by Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act); Cremen v. Harrah's Marina
Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.J. 1988) (claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress
by victim of sexual assault and harassment did not fall within coverage of workers' compensation scheme) with
Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d 1005, 1007 (11 th Cir. 1986) (pendent state law claims for assault and
battery barred by Florida's Workers' Compensation law); Wangler v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 742 F. Supp. 1465 (D.
Haw. 1990) (holding that similar claims for emotional injuries were employment-related and barred by workers'
compensation statute).
369. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3(b) (Supp. 1992); see also Watson v. Nat'l Burial Ass'n, 107 So. 2d 739
(Miss. 1958).
370. Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So. 2d 368, 371 (Miss. 1984).
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ployee is injured over a disagreement about work-related matters, the injury,
although the result of willful conduct, is clearly compensable.3 1 The compensabil-
ity of injuries caused by the intentional acts of co-employees that fall in between
these two guideposts is not easy to determine.
Purely emotional, as opposed to physical injury, is recoverable under workers'
compensation so long as it results from an unexpected occurrence.'72 This is im-
portant because often the victim of sexual harassment will suffer severe emotional
distress without any accompanying physical injury. Her mental injury will be
compensable if the court views sexual harassment as more than an ordinary inci-
dent of employment.
Recently, the Mississippi Supreme Court revisited the issue of the compensabil-
ity of purely mental injuries. In Borden, Inc. v. Eskridge,373 the employee sought
worker's compensation benefits for his mental disability allegedly caused by job-
related stress arising out of the mistreatment he suffered at work.374 Although
there was testimony that his wife, who also worked at the same plant was sexually
harassed by the plant superintendent and that her rejection of his sexual advances
adversely affected her husband's employment, the court did not specifically rely
on this evidence in affirming the claimant's compensation award. s
The Borden decision lends support to the argument that sexual harassment by
co-employees is a risk associated with employment and should be compensated
under the state's Workers' Compensation Act. In any event, this is the position em-
ployers must adopt in order to preclude its employees from obtaining large damage
awards under tort claims.
3 76
VI. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER TO AVOID
TITLE VII LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The potential liability for employers from sexual harassment in the workplace,
and the disruption, disharmony and economic costs that it causes to businesses,
mandate that employers educate themselves about the issue and take practical
steps to mitigate against it.377 Only if an employer considers the issue of sexual
harassment before it occurs will it be prepared to handle a complaint competently
and efficiently when it does finally arise. An effective complaint procedure, when
combined with a prompt remedial response, can immunize an employer from Title
VII liability in hostile environment cases. It may also assist the employer in avoid-
ing state tort liability.
371. See, e.g., Big "2" Engine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1980) (discussing issue in gen-
eral).
372. Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So. 2d 314, 318 (Miss. 1988).
373. No. 89-CC-0787, slip op. (Miss. Nov. 20, 1991).
374. Borden, No. 89-CC-0787, slip op. at I (Miss. Nov. 20, 1991).
375. Id. at 1, 4.
376. In addition, some jurisdictions have held that an employee is barred from bringing common law action
against her employer by accepting workers' compensation benefits even if her claims would not otherwise be pre-
cluded. See Warner v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 346, 353-55 (1981) (claimant's acceptance of benefits foreclosed claim).
377. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing economic burdens on workplace).
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A. Sexual Harassment Policy
Initially, an employer should adopt and implement a sexual harassment policy.
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson"'8 alluded to the fact that a
well-drafted sexual harassment policy could help an employer avoid liability in
cases of sexual harassment, even though it may not unequivocally protect it.379
Cases indicate that a well-drafted policy must contain the following elements.
First, the policy should be specific with regard to harassment, although it may be
combined with a policy prohibiting all manners of harassment, including racial,
religious or ethnic harassment.380 Second, the policy should begin by strongly
condemning sexual harassment in the workplace. Third, the policy should contain
a comprehensive definition of sexual harassment, such as the definition contained
in the EEOC Guidelines. Finally, the policy should be drafted in a way that en-
courages complainants to come forward with a complaint by setting forth an ex-
press grievance procedure for resolving complaints. Indeed, the grievance
procedure is probably the most important element of the policy.
The grievance procedure should explain how an employer will handle com-
plaints. In that regard, the policy should designate the individual to whom com-
plaints should be made. If the employer has a large number of employees and has
an EEOC officer, that person is often the best person to whom complaints should
be funneled. In smaller organizations, the policy can mandate that complaints first
be made to the employee's immediate supervisor, as long as an alternative route is
provided in the event the supervisor is the alleged harasser or the employee be-
lieves the supervisor will not be receptive to the complaint. Several courts have
declared a policy ineffective because the initial complaint had to be made to the
employee's immediate supervisor.381
The procedure should anticipate a mechanism by which the complaints are fun-
neled up to the top management so that no question can be raised regarding proper
notice to management. In addition, the procedure should state that the complaint
will be kept confidential "to the extent possible." Confidentiality should never be
promised, however, as it is often virtually impossible to maintain the matter in
complete confidence while still fulfilling the obligation to investigate the complaint
adequately. In any event, should a matter proceed to the EEOC for litigation, con-
fidentiality is impossible.
The policy should not contradict other portions of the personnel manual so that
no breach of contract claim is possible. For example, if the employer's grievance
procedure for claims of sexual harassment varies from the employer's general
378. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For a full discussion of the Vinson decision, see supra notes 111-18 and accompany-
ing text.
379. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63. No matter how well drafted a policy is, if it does not function properly it will not
mitigate an employer's exposure to liability. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987).
380. A vague written policy or an open-door policy may be insufficient.
381. In Vinson, the Supreme Court concluded that the employer's sexual harassment policy was ineffective,
because it required plaintiff to complain first to her supervisor who was the alleged harasser. Vinson, 477 U.S. at
73.
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grievance procedure, the handbook should cross-reference the two provisions and
explain that the sexual harassment complaint procedure is the sole procedure to be
utilized in those instances. Finally, the procedure should not promise any specific
kind of discipline because that would restrict the employer's options, and because
if it is not meted out, an employee could raise a breach of contract claim.
With regard to technical requirements, the sexual harassment policy should be
in writing and included in the employee's personnel handbook or manual. Regard-
less of the form of publication, the policy should be provided to all employees and
periodically redistributed to the workforce. In addition, it should be posted in a
prominent area in the workplace available to all employees.
B. Investigation
When an employee raises a complaint of sexual harassment, either through the
procedure adopted in a policy 382 or through any other channels, the supervisors or
management should not ignore it in the hope that it will resolve itself or go away.
The employer's goal should be to discover the problem, return the workplace to
harmony, and discourage litigation. The employer should act promptly, carefully,
and in a non-hostile manner to address the complaint. If the complaint appears se-
rious, the employer should consider contacting its labor counsel for assistance in
resolving the matter.
The employer should never discourage the employee from filing a discrimina-
tion charge with the EEOC, as that is his or her legal right. 31 However, the em-
ployer's actions in efficiently and professionally handling the grievance should
assure the disgruntled employee that it is taking her complaint seriously and doing
all that it can to eliminate the offensive behavior, if it exists. By doing this, the
employer may by its actions alone, dissuade the employee from utilizing the ser-
vices of the EEOC. Needless to say, the employer should always show the em-
ployee that it is not ratifying the complained of sexual harassment."
The investigation should be handled very carefully and pursuant to company
policies. The employer should designate an individual, or possibly a committee,
to investigate complaints. It is preferable if the investigator is a superior to the al-
leged harasser. The investigator should also be trained in how to handle these com-
plaints.
The employer should request the complainant to file a written complaint outlin-
ing her factual allegations. If she refuses to make a written complaint, the em-
ployer should nonetheless proceed to investigate and resolve the complaint without
it. However, a written statement helps greatly with the investigation and possible
382. An employer's refusal to investigate complaints through the formal grievance procedure may leave it vul-
nerable to claims by the alleged harasser for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See Martin v. Baer, 928 F2d 1067 (11 th Cir. 1991).
383. In Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987), the employers told its complaining employees not to
go to the EEOC and by doing so helped prove that its anti-harassment policy was ineffective.
384. See, e.g., Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F Supp. 594, 609 (S. D.N. Y. 1990) (supervisor's response to
sexual harassment complaint was insufficient where he told plaintiff "[y]ou are probably better off not making a
stink about it because. . . they will do it even more.").
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subsequent litigation by providing the basis for the investigation. The investigator
should encourage the complainant to include all pertinent actions or facts, which
will discourage the complainant from "manufacturing" facts at a later date. The
person to whom the complaint is filed and the investigator should always document
the complainant's oral statements in writing. In speaking with the complainant,
the supervisor and investigator should be sympathetic but also objective.
If a complaint is submitted anonymously, the employer is still obligated to in-
vestigate it. Such complaints place the employer on notice that sexual harassment
may exist in its workplace and it proceeds at its peril if it ignores the notice. By
ignoring an anonymous complaint, the risk of punitive damages becomes very
real when the complaintant later comes forward.
The investigator should solicit the names of witnesses from the complainant
who may be able to support or verify her complaint. The investigator should talk to
those witnesses in as businesslike a manner as possible, without divulging unnec-
essary facts. In addition, the investigator should interview the alleged harasser as
objectively as possible for his side of the story. Lawsuits initiated by the alleged
harasser claiming sex discrimination, or other common law claims, are not un-
common, and the employer must appear professional at all times.
The employer should attempt to decrease the publicity that may result from this
matter. Unfortunately, the sensationalism of the story can hurt both the employer
and the individual parties involved. The employer is protected from defamation li-
ability by a qualified privilege if the allegedly defamatory statements are made in
good faith and without malice. 8 This privilege, however, should not deter an em-
ployer from being discreet during the course of the investigation.
The employer should maintain a separate file from the affected employees' per-
sonnel files for the sexual harassment complaint and investigation. The record
should be thorough because it will form the foundational evidence for the EEOC
and the courts in assessing the reasonableness of the employer's responses. All
conversations regarding the matter should be fully documented. The investigator
should prepare for the record a narrative of the complaint, the investigation, and
the ultimate findings. The record should not include extensive opinions by the in-
vestigator; it should concentrate on the facts. The record should also include the
employer's prescribed remedies and discipline. Access by other employees to
these files should be strictly prohibited.
The employer should avoid inserting negative information into the alleged
harasser's personnel file unless the employer has made a finding of culpability.
Likewise, the employer should not mention the claim to a prospective employer of
the alleged harasser unless there has been a finding of guilt. With regard to the vic-
tim, if she had to take an extended personal or sick leave because of the harass-
385. Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont, Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987). There are two issues with re-
gard to a qualified privilege: (1) "whether the occasion for a statement is a matter of qualified privilege" and (2)
"whether the exercise and use of the privilege was improper." Id. at 385-86. The privilege may also be lost if the
employer acts in bad faith or with malice. Id. at 388.
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ment, the reason for the leave should be accurately documented so that it will be
apparent why she missed work. 8 Records regarding the complaint should be
maintained for at least three to five years. Although most of the pertinent statutes
of limitations are shorter than five years, the information can assist in any claim of
a continuing violation. If the investigation is reopened, the reason should be docu-
mented in the file.
If the investigation shows that sexual harassment did exist, the employer should
make every reasonable effort to ensure that it stops. Indeed, the employer has an
affirmative duty to eradicate sexual harassment from the workplace. Thus, the
employer may have to transfer or discharge the harasser. In determining the disci-
pline of the harasser, the employer should consider not only the severity and per-
vasiveness of the acts but also any prior misconduct. All efforts should be made to
make the complainant comfortable with the resolution. Although the employer is
not required to terminate a harasser in order to appease his victim, according to
the Ninth Circuit Court in Ellison v. Brady,387 the employer should determine the
impact of the remedy on the complainant. The employer should discipline offend-
ers in a nondiscriminatory manner; that is, nondiscriminatory on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability. 88
The complainant should never be perceived as being punished or having to suf-
fer a job detriment in order to resolve the matter. For example, if the day shift su-
pervisor harassed a female employee on that shift, the victim should not be
transferred to the less desirable night shift in order to separate the individuals.
It is important that all disputes should be resolved in some concrete, docu-
mented manner. Both parties should be informed by letter of the employer's find-
ings and the remedies. If the investigation determines that sexual harassment did
not exist, the employer should inform both parties of this fact by letter and state
that it is closing the investigation. The most difficult situation concerns instances
in which it is impossible to determine the credibility of the parties. In these in-
stances, the employer should act as an arbitrator and attempt to restore harmony in
the workplace. Both parties should be informed of the employer's inability to con-
firm that sexual harassment took place. Also, in the letters, the employer should
stress that sexual harassment will not be tolerated in the future. The employer may
ask the complainant to sign a statement attesting to the fact that she is satisfied with
the results of its investigation and the steps taken by the employer to end the sexual
harassment. However, this must be strictly voluntary, and the employer should
never pressure the employee or retaliate against an employee because she refuses
to do so.
386. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987).
387. 924 F2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
388. See Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F2d 904 (5th Cir. 1992) (Hispanic who was forced to resign because of allega-
tions of sexual harassment brought suit against employer for race discrimination because white employee accused
of similar conduct was not discharged).
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C. General Prophylactic Measures
There are key steps that all employers should take to avoid liability for sexual
harassment claims. As discussed fully above, the most important step is to develop
a sexual harassment policy. However, employers should also consider performing
an internal audit of their workplaces to determine whether sexual jokes or conver-
sation occurs and if sexual pictures or graffiti are exhibited. Employers should fol-
low up on rumors about such activity and should never consider these activities to
be acceptable in a typical male environment. Supervisors should counsel employ-
ees about the activities and demand that they cease. Because of increased aware-
ness as to employees' rights with regard to sexual harassment, an employee may
likely file a complaint, especially in the aftermath of the Clarence Thomas confir-
mation hearings. An employer's inaction, after notice that sexual harassment ex-
ists, may be the factor that causes it substantial liability.
Some employers go to the extent of adopting a "nonfraternization" policy be-
tween supervisors and employees that they oversee. However, it is not recom-
mended that the employers break up romantic liaisons between employees that
already exist and do not cause a problem.
Employers should educate their workforce about sexual harassment by training
supervisors and managers as to the definition of sexual harassment and steps they
should take to eradicate it. They must be reminded of the tremendous costs to the
business because of sexual harassment, and the fact that the supervisors may be
held individually liable for sexual harassment. As a final consideration, employers
should never retaliate against an employee for raising a sexual harassment com-
plaint, filing an EEOC charge, filing a lawsuit, or acting as a witness for another
employee. An employer only multiplies its legal problems in doing so or in permit-
ting a supervisor or other employee to do so, because it provides the employee
with an independent cause of action under Title VII. 389 Employers should also en-
sure that supervisors are cognizant of the necessity not to retaliate.
VII. CONCLUSION
The law of sexual harassment changes as society's view of permissible conduct
in the workplace changes. To be actionable, the complained of conduct must be
offensive to a reasonable person (in some jurisdictions, to a reasonable person of
the same gender as the victim), and, thus, must be objectionable to society in gen-
eral. Judge Jones, in her dissenting opinion in Waltman v. International Paper
Co. ,39 concluded that the sexual mores in our society were such that it would be
unfair legally to require employers to eradicate sexual graffiti from their establish-
ment. In Waltman, Judge Jones argued that America's children are exposed every-
day to vulgarities worse or comparable to the sexual graffiti complained of in that
case and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect the employer in Waltman,
389. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
390. 875 F.2d 468, 482-87 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jones, J., dissenting).
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or any other employer, to provide sexually sterile work environment."' 1 What
Judge Jones failed to consider, however, is that sexual conduct is not inherently of-
fensive and is perfectly acceptable in many contexts - none of which include the
workplace. Just because sexual conduct consumes, for example, the entertainment
world does not mean that employees should assume the risk of exposure to an of-
fensive work environment. There is no reason to allow sexual behavior that may
occur, for example, in night clubs, to spill over into the workplace where employ-
ees are vulnerable to economic coercion.
In addition, strikingly offensive conduct engaged in outside the workplace,
such as expressly segregated organizations or racial name-calling, has not gener-
ally been declared illegal; yet it is illegal in the context of the workplace. Congress
has legislatively determined that certain practices should not and will not be toler-
ated in the employment context. Thus, a comparison between what occurs in soci-
ety and the workplace is inappropriate.
Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings provided a forum for public debate
which hopefully will lead to a greater awareness of the problem and to a consensus
that such behavior does not belong in the workplace. If so, then the law of sexual
harassment will have changed for the better.
391. Id. at 486.
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